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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first essay investigates the implications of the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefit cycle, whereby the benefits are paid 
once per month, but often do not last for the entire month. We examine whether the benefit cycle 
affects the timing of medical visits among SNAP recipients. We find that the likelihood of visiting 
emergency departments, outpatient providers, and dentists are lower in the last week of the benefit 
month for two-parent, but not single-parent households. This is consistent with the finding that 
two-parent households have a higher propensity to spend SNAP benefits early in the month than 
single-parent households, which leads to higher cash spending on food during the last week of the 
benefit month. These results suggest that two-parent households may need to reduce spending on 
medical care at the end of the SNAP benefit month in order to reallocate cash income to the 
purchase of food. Moreover, we show that the reduction in emergency room visits is concentrated 
among emergent injury-related visits and does not differ by insurance coverage. We thus conclude 
that the benefit cycle not only constitutes a direct barrier to care but also affects health care 
utilization indirectly by reducing the need for care. 
The second essay examines how the SNAP affects labor force decisions. Labor supply theory 
predicts that social welfare programs will provide work disincentives to low-paid workers. In 
response to concerns about welfare dependency, past policy reforms linked work requirements to 
the SNAP. As a result, for those subject to a work requirement, the labor supply effect of SNAP 
participation is theoretically ambiguous. This paper empirically examines the impact of SNAP 
enrollment on labor supply. To account for non-random selection into SNAP, we use quasi-
experimental variation in the purchasing power of SNAP benefit amounts as an instrument. For a 
household of the same composition, SNAP benefit levels are fixed across states, but local food 
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prices vary widely, leading to substantial variation in the real value of SNAP benefits. Our IV-
fixed effect results suggest that SNAP participation increases the likelihood of employment and 
full-time work among low-income adults. We also find evidence that SNAP participation 
facilitates employment by increasing the recipients’ ability to pay for job-related expenses such as 
childcare. Moreover, we find that SNAP improves physical and mental health, which could also 
contribute to higher work effort. 
 The third essay investigates the effect of the Medicaid fee bump, the largest ever increase 
in Medicaid primary care reimbursement rates, on the use of medical services. We find that higher 
Medicaid payments to primary care providers increase the number of office-based primary care 
visits. This increase is much larger for mid-level providers than physicians, indicating that the 
availability of nurse practitioners and physician assistants is important to how the Medicaid 
program accommodates additional patients. We also find that higher Medicaid fees are associated 
with improvements in access to timely care and an increase in the utilization of prescription drugs, 
suggesting that some of the additional primary care services by Medicaid enrollees led to 
actionable treatment plans. Our results also provide evidence that Medicaid patients reduce their 
use of emergency departments when access to primary care improves. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
The Within-Month Pattern of Medical Care Utilization among 
SNAP Households 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Although the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp 
Program) plays a leading role in preventing malnutrition by supplementing food budgets (Hoynes 
and Schanzenbach 2009), potential negative effects of the monthly nature of benefits provision 
have been raised. Administrative records reveal that a large proportion of households redeem 
nearly all of their benefits in the first two weeks of the month (Castner and Henke 2011). This 
results in what is known as the SNAP benefit cycle, whereby SNAP participants purchase and 
consume more food at the beginning of the benefit month with SNAP benefits, but less and lower 
quality food towards the end of the month when their benefits are exhausted (Todd 2015; Wilde 
and Ranney 2000; Shapiro 2005; Damon et al. 2013; Hamrick and Andrews 2016; Castellari et al. 
2017; Kuhn 2018; Gregory and Smith 2019). In this paper, we investigate whether the benefit 
cycle also affects the timing of medical visits among SNAP-recipients.  
Under the permanent income hypothesis framework, these results are puzzling, as 
consumption should be unrelated to when expected income is received. Shapiro (2005) attributes 
the end of the month shift in consumption to present-biased time preferences, whereby decision 
makers over-consume in the present, without internalizing that they will fail to resist the temptation 
to do so again in the future. He argues that an empirical manifestation of this is downward-sloping 
intra-month consumption profiles. Smith et al. (2016) find that short-run impatience contributes to 
the SNAP benefit cycle and that non-fungibility of income can exacerbate the effect of impatience 
on consumption decisions.  
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On the other hand, prior studies of SNAP households suggest that intra-household resource 
allocation decisions may have a significant impact on food purchases and nutrition. For example, 
Breunig and Dasgupta (2005) construct a noncooperative model of intra-household decision-
making and use it to demonstrate that food purchases in multiple-adult SNAP households would 
decrease if their benefits were replaced with a cash transfer. There is also evidence of such intra-
household disagreements over the allocation of resources among welfare recipients enrolled in 
other public programs (Angelucci 2008; Hidrobo and Fernald 2013; Hsu 2017). For example, Hsu 
(2017) finds an increase in reports of male-on-female assault shortly after the household receives 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) payments. 
These findings suggest that intra-household resource allocation decisions could be 
exacerbating the degree of the cycle in a two-parent household. The primary SNAP recipient 
(usually the mother in two-parent households) has greater control over program benefits than other 
family members.1 If SNAP benefits are exhausted at the end of the month, then the primary 
recipient will need to obtain cash income to purchase the same quantity and quality of food during 
the last week of the month as during the prior three weeks. Under the assumption that the primary 
recipient has greater preferences than the non-primary-recipient adult members for food, the 
benefit owner can pre-commit the household to a monthly consumption plan closer to the 
individual preference by exhausting SNAP benefits early in the month. This strategic behavior 
persuades non-primary-recipient member to contribute more cash income to buy food at the end 
of the month. This pre-commitment device increases the household’s total food consumption, but 
 
 
1 As part of the 1996 welfare reform act states are required to issue SNAP benefits through the Electronic Benefit 
Transfer (EBT) system. State EBT instructions explicitly tell primary recipients (usually the mother) not to give their 
PIN to anyone else; if they want a family member to access the benefits, the primary recipient is instructed to apply 
for a second EBT card to be used by that family member. 
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only at the cost of cyclical consumption pattern over the course of the month (although, this does 
not rule out the existence of cycle independent of the household type driven by other factors such 
as short-run impatience).  
Although SNAP benefits must be spent on food, the benefit cycle may also have implications 
for medical care consumption. Conceptually, there are a number of reasons why health care 
utilization may be impacted by the SNAP benefit cycle. First, deductibles, copayments, and other 
costs of medical visits, such as transportation costs, or the need to reduce paid work time may 
discourage medical care utilization to free up cash income for food purchases when SNAP benefits 
are exhausted. One would expect such an effect to be less consequential for the publicly insured 
who typically face the lowest copayments and deductibles. 
Second, SNAP payments may impact health care consumption indirectly, via changes in 
health. The end of month change in nutrient availability may have adverse effects on participants’ 
health and result in medical care utilization. This is likely to be the case only for participants with 
diet-sensitive chronic conditions, such as diabetes or gastroesophageal reflux disease. 
Alternatively, the indirect effect could be negative if households reduce certain types of 
consumption which affect the need for hospital care when the benefits are exhausted. For instance, 
if some consumers spend more on recreational drugs on the benefit receipt days, then such a change 
in consumption patterns might affect health care utilization by leading to adverse events. Such a 
mechanism would be consistent with the finding that SNAP payments change the pattern of 
alcohol purchases (Hastings and Washington 2010) and alcohol-related accidents (Cotti et al. 
2016).  
The literature regarding the affordability of health care supports the view that individuals 
may not consume the health care they need because they cannot afford it. For example, Moran and 
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Simon (2006) estimate that an increase in lifetime income (driven by the Social Security benefits 
“notch”) increases the consumption of pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, previous studies have 
demonstrated that cash welfare programs affect hospital visits by increasing the need for 
emergency care (Dobkin and Puller 2007; Gross and Tobacman 2014).  
Only a few studies consider the within-month patterns of medical care utilization using data 
on either SNAP participants or low-income households in general, and the findings are 
contradictory. Heflin et al. (2017) use administrative data from the Missouri SNAP and 
Medicaid programs to examine whether the timing of the benefits affects the within-month pattern 
of emergency room visits for hypoglycemia and find no evidence of a cyclical pattern. Heflin et 
al. (2019) find a similar result with regards to SNAP timing and childhood asthma. In contrast, 
Seligman et al. (2014) show that inpatient admissions for hypoglycemia increased by 27 percent 
in the last week of the month relative to the first week for the low-income population in California. 
Similarly, Basu et al. (2017) find using data on medical claims that nonelderly adults in the lower 
half of the income distribution have a higher probability of visiting the emergency room and being 
hospitalized for the treatment of hypoglycemia at the end of the calendar month.  
This paper is the first comprehensive study that investigates whether the SNAP benefit cycle 
alters consumption patterns for medical care, and specifically, whether benefit-receiving 
households reduce their medical care utilization towards the end of the benefit month. In order to 
explore whether intra-household bargaining could be exacerbating the degree of the SNAP benefit 
cycle, we examine medical care utilization patterns across the benefit month for two-parent and 
single-parent households, separately.  
Our results suggest that there is a reduction in the probability of visiting medical care 
providers at the end of the benefit month among SNAP-recipient households. However, only two-
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parent households experience cycles in medical care utilization that are attributed to SNAP 
payments. We document evidence that two-parent households exhibit a much higher propensity to 
spend SNAP benefits at the beginning of the month, which leads to higher cash spending on food 
during the last week of the benefit month. Consequently, two-parent households may need to 
reduce non-food spending at the end of the SNAP benefit month in order to reallocate cash income 
to the purchase of food. For example, we find that the likelihood of visiting a dentist and outpatient 
provider is lower in the last week of the benefit month than the beginning of the month.  
Moreover, our results suggest that SNAP benefits also affect medical care use by inducing 
risky forms of consumption. We find that the decline in emergency room visits is concentrated 
among injury and accident-related visits, in which the timing of care is not discretionary. Thus, the 
liquidity constraint at the end of the benefit month not only is a direct barrier to care but also 
impacts health care utilization indirectly, via changes in health. 
1.2 Data 
The main data source used in this paper is the 1996-2013 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS). The MEPS is a comprehensive, nationally representative survey of the U.S. civilian non-
institutionalized population. It contains detailed information for each individual in the household 
on demographic characteristics, socioeconomic status, health status, health insurance coverage, 
and whether anyone in the household received SNAP in the past year. Respondents are also 
interviewed about their medical care use over the course of two years through five survey rounds. 
We analyze medical care utilization patterns for outpatient visits (visits to office-based 
physicians and hospital outpatient departments), emergency room (ER) visits, dental visits, and 
visits to inpatients facilities (i.e. hospitals). We use information on the date of each medical visit 
to determine in which week of the month the visit occurred. We define the first seven days of the 
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month as week 1 and the last seven days of the month as week 4. The remaining days of the month 
are split evenly between weeks 2 and 3, with an extra day added to week 3 as needed.2  
We consider two sets of analysis. In our first analysis, we subset the sample to SNAP 
participants if the household received SNAP in any of the twelve months. Our second analysis 
considers a sample of SNAP-eligible individuals to compare the utilization pattern of SNAP 
participants with utilization pattern of SNAP-eligible non-participating households. In order to 
determine whether households were eligible for SNAP benefits we use information in the MEPS 
to predict whether each household passed the gross income and net income tests. Although 
households must also pass an asset test to receive SNAP benefits, the MEPS does not contain 
sufficient information for us to evaluate this eligibility criteria (USDA, SNAP Eligibility 2016; 
USDA, Income Eligibility Standards 2016). However, only 3% of households who apply for 
SNAP benefits fail the asset test (Wheaton et al. 2016). The exact method we use to determine 
SNAP eligibility is contained in the supplementary appendix.  
We further restrict our sample to households with at least one child under age 18 and exclude 
households with a parent younger than age 20 or older than age 50. We disaggregate the sample 
into single-parent and two-parent households. Parents that were not married, but cohabitated with 
another adult, are classified as two-parent households.  
The primary explanatory variable in our regression model is whether a particular individual 
in week 𝑤𝑤 is in the last week of the benefit month. Not all states issue SNAP benefits on the same 
day of the month to all households, nor do they all issue benefits at the very beginning of the 
calendar month. Some states choose to distribute benefits over several weeks during the month 
 
 
2 We drop visits where the date of treatment visit is missing. Since we are concerned that there might be selection 
into non-reporting, we re-estimate our models using only the subset of individuals with non-missing information on 
the date of all treatment visits and the results are quantitatively similar to our main results.   
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(USDA, SNAP Monthly Benefit Issuance Schedule 2016). One limitation of the MEPS is that it 
does not include information on the date when each household last received SNAP benefits, so it 
is impossible to determine the last week of benefit month for all SNAP recipients with certainty. 
Therefore, using state and county codes contained in the restricted-use MEPS, we merge data on 
the historical monthly SNAP benefit issuance schedule in each state and calculate the probability 
that each calendar week is the last week of the benefit month.3,4 In order to check the validity of 
our conclusions from this approach, we also perform a robustness check on the subsample of 
households from states that issue benefits on a single day of the month.5 
Control variables in each model include age (dichotomous indicators for age 7–17, 18–30, 
31–45, 31–45, 46–60 , 61–75, age 76 and older with age 0–6 as the omitted category), gender, race 
and ethnicity (Hispanic, black, and other race with white as the omitted category), region (South, 
Midwest, and West with Northeast omitted), urban residence, education (high school diploma, any 
college, with less than a high school degree omitted), number of children in the household, the log 
of total family income normalized by the square root of household size, and insurance coverage 
(Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance with uninsured omitted).  In order to control for health 
status, we use self-reported mental and physical health (poor/fair health in all rounds, poor/fair 
health in some rounds, excellent health in some rounds, excellent health in all rounds, good/very 
good health in all rounds, and self-reported health is missing, with good/very good health in some 
rounds serving as the omitted category for both mental and physical health) and a measure of 
 
 
3 For example, the benefits are made available over the first 10 days in California every month. We assign probabilities 
of 3/10 to calendar week 1, and 7/10 to calendar week 4 for being last benefit weeks.  
4 New York follows two different schedules for the Upstate and New York City regions. Therefore, we use county 
codes to merge the monthly distribution dates in New York. 
5 We drop Alabama, Illinois, Missouri, Mississippi and New Mexico from our sample because their benefit 
payments are spread over a large number of days. Benefits are made available over 20 days in New Mexico and 
Alabama, 22 days in Missouri, 18 days in Mississippi, and on the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 
17th, and 20th of every month in Illinois. 
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disability status. The latter is a binary variable that indicates whether the person had an IADL 
(Instrumental Activities of Daily Living) or ADL (Activities of Daily Living), functional, activity, 
or sensory limitation in any interview round.  
We also include control variables in our models for a number of state characteristics that 
were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau: state-level per-capita income, the poverty rate, 
unemployment rate and the percentage of persons 25 years of age and older with a bachelor’s 
degree. Table 1-1 contains descriptive statistics for all of the variables we use in the analysis by 
household type and SNAP participation. These statistics show clear selection into SNAP by 
individuals with lower incomes, less education, poorer health status, and higher rates of disability, 
and by Medicaid recipients. 
1.3 Empirical Strategy 
1.3.1 Analysis of SNAP-Recipient Households 
In this section, we analyze within-month medical care utilization patterns for SNAP participating 
households. This model is estimated on medical care utilization data that are aggregated by week 
of the month for each individual. In particular, we estimate the following linear regression model 
that predicts whether the individual visits a medical care provider in a given week:  Pr(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜓𝜓 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, (1-1) 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a binary indictor of a visit by individual 𝑖𝑖 to a medical care provider in state 𝑠𝑠, year 
𝑡𝑡, and week 𝑤𝑤, where 𝑤𝑤 = 1, … ,4. 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the probability that a particular individual in state 𝑠𝑠 
in week 𝑤𝑤 is in the last week of the benefit month (as described in the data section). 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector 
of covariates including individual and family-level demographic and socioeconomic variables, 
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health insurance coverage, self-reported health status and a measure of disability.6 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is a vector 
of year fixed-effects and 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is a vector of state fixed-effects. We also include 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, a vector of week 
fixed effects which account for common payroll trends (i.e. 1st or 15th of a month). Standard errors 
are clustered by the state to account for serial correlation of the errors within states over time. 
Table 1-2 contains the effects of being in the last week of the SNAP benefit month on 
medical care utilization from equation (1-1) for both two-parent and single-parent SNAP 
households. Our models are estimated on outpatient visits, ER visits, dental visits, and inpatient 
admissions. We find that both two-parent and single-parent households are less likely to visit an 
outpatient provider at the end of the SNAP benefit month. While two-parent SNAP households 
are 3.1 percentage points (10.5%) less likely to visit an outpatient provider in the last week of the 
benefit month, the reduction in outpatient visits by single-parent households is 2.8 percentage 
points (9.1%). We also find that the probability of visiting a dentist is 1.6 percentage points 
(23.5%) lower in the last week of the SNAP benefit month than at the beginning of the month for 
two-parent households. However, we do not find any significant change in the pattern of dental 
visits among single-parent households. Finally, the likelihood of inpatient admissions and ER 
visits do not vary significantly at the end of the benefit month for both types of households. The 
results from alternative dependent variables, the log of number of visits are quantitatively similar 
(Table 1-2, Panel B).7  
To offer additional clarity on the differential effect of being in the last week of the month 
for two-parent households, we interact our 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖in equation (1-1) with a dummy variable 
 
 
6 In our main specification, we include household income as a control variable. We also estimate our models that do 
not include household income and the results are quantitatively similar to our main results.   
 
7 The outcome takes zero if an individual does not have any visit in week 𝑤𝑤. 
12 
indicating whether SNAP-recipient household is a two-parent household. We estimate this model 
on the sample of SNAP-recipients (both two-parent and single-parent households). As shown in 
Table 1-3, individuals in a two-parent household experience an additional statistically significant 
decrease of 1.1 percentage points (21.5%) in the probability of ER visit at the end of the benefit 
cycle. In Table 1-3 there is an imprecise negative effect of being in the last week of the month on 
the probability of any dental visit. However, when we use the log of the number of dental visits as 
an alternative specification of the dependent variable, we find that two-parent households are 0.6 
percent less likely to visit a dentist when they are in the last week of the benefit month. 
1.3.2 Analysis of SNAP-Eligible Households 
The results in Tables 1-2 and 1-3 provide evidence of monthly cycle in medical care utilization. 
However, a limitation of the preceding analysis is that we may not be able to fully distinguish the 
effect of the SNAP benefit cycle from other possible cycles. Much like SNAP, evidence suggests 
that other streams of income are not spent smoothly.  For example, Stephens (2006) shows that 
expenditures increase immediately upon receipt of a paycheck.8 In order to difference out trends 
in medical care utilization that are not related to SNAP payments, we compare medical care 
utilization patterns of both of SNAP households to SNAP-eligible non-participating households. 
Since enrollment in SNAP is voluntary, we use both panel data models and instrumental variables 
to account for selection into SNAP by individuals with unobserved attributes that are correlated 
with medical care use and the SNAP participation decision (Meyerhoefer and Yang 2011). 
Fixed-Effects Model 
 
 
8 Other evidence includes analyses of the immediate consumption response to semi-annual bonuses (Browning and 
Collado 2001), income tax refunds (Souleles 1999), annual payments to Alaskans from the Alaska Permanent Fund 
(Hsieh 2003), and the final payment of a car loan (Stephens 2008).  
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Under the assumption that the unobservable characteristics of SNAP participants correlated with 
medical care utilization are time invariant, we can account for the endogeneity of SNAP 
participation using individual fixed-effects. We believe this is reasonable because the primary 
unobserved characteristics of SNAP participants likely to lead to endogeneity bias are preferences 
for medical care and health status. While the former is likely time invariant, the latter is usually 
time varying. However, we include controls in our model with self-reported physical and mental 
health, which should capture changes in health status, leaving as unobserved the component of 
health status that is time invariant. We therefore use the following specification: Pr(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛽𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜓𝜓 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+ 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, (1-2) 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one if individual 𝑖𝑖 is a SNAP recipient, and equal 
to zero otherwise.9 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 is a stochastic time-invariant individual specific effect that captures the 
unobserved determinants of medical care utilization. The main effects of interest are 𝛽𝛽, the effect 
of SNAP participation on medical care utilization, and 𝛾𝛾, the effect of being in the last week of the 
SNAP benefit cycle on a SNAP recipient’s decision to visit a medical provider.  
Instrumental Variables Model 
Our instrumental variable model is specified as a recursive bivariate probit model. The first 
equation in the model predicts SNAP participation and the second equation, which is a function of 
SNAP participation, predicts whether the individual visits a medical care provider in a given week 
of the month. Therefore, we have: Pr(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜆𝜆 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜑𝜑 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖), (1-3) Pr(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝛽𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜓𝜓 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖), (1-4) 
 
 
9 We also estimate models that include 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 as both an individual regressor and interaction term, and find similar 
results. Importantly, the estimated coefficients on 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 in those models are not statistically different from zero. 
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where Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is our instruments for 
SNAP participation. The error terms (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) are assumed to be independent of 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 
distributed as bivariate normal with mean zero and unit variance. In addition, 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜐𝜐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
is assumed to be non-zero. 
The instruments we use to identify SNAP participation are simplified reporting requirements 
and whether the SNAP recipient’s state of residence operates call centers (USDA, SNAP Policy 
Database 2016). State-level variables have been widely used in the literature as instruments for 
SNAP participation (Meyerhoefer and Pylypchuk 2008, Yen et al. 2008, Ratcliffe et al. 2011, 
Gregory and Deb 2015).10 The functions of call centers vary widely by state. Most call centers 
allow clients to report changes in income, assets, or household membership, answer general 
questions, and provide case information. Based on data from 2011, call centers completed initial 
application interviews and approved SNAP applications in four states, and some call centers in the 
state provided these services in eight other states (Rowe et al. 2010; USDA 2011). Under 
simplified reporting, SNAP households must only report income changes that occur during the 
reporting period if they result in total countable income rising above 130 percent of the poverty 
level. The 2002 Farm Bill gave states the discretion to extend simplified reporting requirements to 
households with non-earned income, referred to as expanded simplified reporting. Many states 
also lengthened reporting intervals to 4, 5 or 6 months for 12 month certification periods. We only 
distinguish between states that adopted any form of simplified reporting and those that did not. 
Call centers and simplified reporting improve program access, as a result, households in states in 
 
 
10 Call center is the most powerful predictor of SNAP participation in our sample of eligible households with young 
children. 
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which call center services are available or adopted simplified reporting are more likely to 
participate in SNAP. 
We calculate the marginal effect of SNAP participation as: 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸1 =  𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡,𝑋𝑋) −  𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 0 ,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 0,𝑋𝑋). (1-5) 
The estimated treatment effect of the coefficient on the interaction term in nonlinear models such 
as ours is given by the incremental effect of the coefficient on the interaction term (see Puhani 
2012; Mayer et al. 2014). We therefore calculate the marginal effect of a SNAP participant being 
at the end of the benefit month on medical care utilization as: 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 1,𝑋𝑋) −         𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 = 1 ,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 × 𝑤𝑤𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 0,𝑋𝑋). (1-6) 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Main Results 
Tables 1-4 contains estimates of the impact of SNAP participation and being in the last week of 
the SNAP benefit month on medical care utilization for two-parent and single-parent households. 
We present estimated effects from both FE model and our IV model that is identified using the 
presence of state SNAP call centers and simplified reporting requirements as instrumental 
variables. The first stage F-statistic for the instrument in the sample of two-parent households is 
11.5, which exceeds the conventional threshold for sufficiently powerful instruments of F = 10 
(Stock et al. 2002). However, in the sample of single-parent households, the F-statistic drops to 
8.6.  
We find that SNAP participation is associated with an increase in the probability of an 
outpatient visit by 2.2 – 4.0 percentage points (8.1% – 14.4%) (Table 1-4, Panel A). We also find 
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that the probability that an individual in a two-parent household visits an outpatient provider is 0.6 
– 1.5 percentage points (2.2% – 5.5%) lower at the end of the SNAP benefit month than at the 
beginning of the month. The marginal effects for emergency room (ER) visits among two-parent 
households indicate that SNAP participation is associated with an increase in the probability of 
visiting the ER by 0.7 – 1.1 percentage points (18.9% – 29.7%). As is the case with outpatient 
visits, the likelihood that a SNAP participant in a two-parent household visits the ER is 0.4 – 1.6 
percentage points (10.9% – 43%) lower in the last week of the SNAP benefit month. We also find 
that SNAP participation is associated with a 0.7 percentage point (6.3%) increase in dental visits 
among two-parent households, but there is a 1.1 percentage point (15.9%) reduction in the 
probability of visiting a dentist at the end of the benefit cycle. We also find SNAP participation 
increases the likelihood of an inpatient admission among two-parent households by 0.4 percentage 
points (20%), although the marginal effect of SNAP participation in the IV model is not 
statistically significant.  
The analogous effects of SNAP participation and the SNAP benefit cycle on medical care 
utilization among single-parent households are reported in Table 1-4, Panel B.  In this case, we do 
not find any statistically significant impact of SNAP participation on outpatient visits in the IV 
model, but we our FE model suggests that SNAP participation is associated with a 2.1 percentage 
points (7.3%) increase in the probability of visiting an outpatient provider. We also find that SNAP 
participants in single-parent households are between 0.8 – 1.4 percentage points (16.3% – 28.5%) 
more likely to visit the ER, 4.0 percentage points (10.3%) more likely to visit a dentist, and 0.6 – 
0.9 percentage points (28.5% – 45%) more likely to be admitted to an inpatient facility than eligible 
non-participants eligible non-participants. However, there is no difference in the likelihood of ER, 
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dental visit, outpatient visits, or inpatient admissions across the SNAP benefit month for single-
parent SNAP households.  
1.4.2 Heterogeneity by Age  
We re-estimate our fixed-effects models for two-parent households and single-parent households 
separately on the sub-samples of adults and children, and report the estimates in Table 1-5. 
Splitting the samples in this manner greatly reduces sample size, which results in a loss in statistical 
precision. Nonetheless, the results suggest there are differences in how resources are allocated 
between adults and children in SNAP households. In particular, the reduced likelihood of ER, 
outpatient and dental visits at the end of the SNAP benefit month is concentrated among adults. 
As before, these probabilities do not vary across the SNAP benefit month in single-parent 
households.   
1.4.3 Misreporting of SNAP Participation in the MEPS 
An important identification problem that arises in this study is nonrandom measurement error. 
This is because a large fraction of recipients fail to report their participation in SNAP, and as a 
result, the rate of SNAP participation in household surveys is lower than the actual participation 
rate (see, for example, Bollinger and David 1997; Meyer et al. 2015). Our findings may be biased 
if underreporting is more prevalent in single-parent households than in the two-parents, or vice 
versa. Researchers often estimate misreporting with linked administrative data (see, for example, 
Meyer and George 2011). We do not have access to such data. In order to examine the possibility 
that our results are confounded by measurement error, we estimate our models after an adjustment 
for the mis-classification of SNAP enrollment. We use variation in the state-level rates of SNAP 
participation to predict the likelihood of participation for SNAP-eligible households based on 
demographic information and socio-economic status. We then reclassify participation status for 
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individuals who did not report participating in SNAP in the MEPS with the highest predicted 
participation levels until the rate of SNAP participation in the MEPS equals the national rate of 
SNAP participation in each year. We describe this procedure in greater detail in the supplementary 
appendix. 
Table 1-6 contains estimates from our FE model on the dataset where some SNAP non-
participants have been reclassified as participants using the method described above. Overall, the 
results are very similar to those from the original FE model, suggesting that measurement error 
bias does not change the qualitative conclusions from our models. 
1.4.4 Single-Day Distribution States 
Another limitation of our analysis using the MEPS is that we often do not know on which day a 
household received its SNAP benefits. Rather, we use the probability that a given week is the last 
week of the benefit month in our empirical model. To check the robustness of our results, we 
estimate models on the subsample of households in states that issue benefits on a single day of the 
month. In these states we know with certainty when households receive benefits11. When we 
restrict our dataset to states with a single day distribution schedule, we estimate a univariate probit 
model on the sample of SNAP recipients (rather than SNAP-eligible households) and report the 
results in Table 1-7. The findings from these models are qualitatively similar to those from models 
using data from the larger set of states. Two-parent SNAP households are less likely to visit 
outpatient provides, dentists or the ER at the end of the benefit month, but this is not the case in 
single-parent SNAP households. 
 
 
11 In 2004, the following states issued benefits on a single day of the month: Alaska (1st), Nevada (1st), New-
Hampshire (5th), Oklahoma (1st), Rhode Island (1st), South Dakota (10th), Vermont (1st), and Virginia (1st). 
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1.4.5 Effects by Insurance Coverage 
In section 1, we discussed two possible mechanisms for the reduction in visits at the end of the 
benefit month. First, households may delay non-food purchases, such as medical care, at the end 
of the SNAP benefit month in order to make food purchases after SNAP benefits are exhausted. 
Alternatively, the change in visits may be driven indirectly, by a change in consumption patterns 
that may affect health care needs. For instance, if the benefit cycle reduces general activity, then 
that consumption itself may lead to a reduction in the use of medical services. This section 
distinguishes between the income and health channel by exploring which patients are responsible 
for the results above.  
In addition to controlling for insurance coverage in our main models, we estimate our models 
on the sub-sample of beneficiaries of the Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) who are also eligible for SNAP (Table 1-8).12 If liquidity constraints constitute direct 
barriers to care, they would be relatively less consequential for Medicaid beneficiaries who have 
comprehensive coverage and typically face the lowest copayments and deductibles. We do note 
that dental coverage is an optional benefit for adults under Medicaid (GAO, 2000a and 2000b). In 
2016, 33 states plus the District of Columbia provided dental coverage to adults, 13 states only 
offered coverage for pain relief or emergency dental services, and 4 states did not provide any 
coverage (KFF 2016). As a result, in the case of dental visits, we estimate our models on the sub-
sample of SNAP-eligible individuals with dental insurance coverage. 
The estimates for the population with insurance coverage indicate that the likelihood of 
visiting the ER at the end of the SNAP benefit month are reduced by roughly the same amount as 
 
 
12 SCHIP is a Medicaid expansion program that provides Medicaid benefits to children and, in some states, parents 
whose income is too high to quality for traditional Medicaid benefits. Hereafter, we refer to this group as the Medicaid 
population. 
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in the full SNAP population in two-parent households. However, in contrast to other SNAP 
recipients, the population with insurance coverage are not less likely to visit outpatient providers 
or dentists at the end of the benefit month. While the income channel is not a plausible explanation 
for the end of the month reduction in ER visits, the changes in dental visits and outpatient visits 
are more consistent with the income channel as opposed to the health channel.  
1.4.6 Effects by ER Visit Category 
In order to investigate whether the health channel contributes to the end of the month changes in 
medical visits, we compare the types of visits that drive our findings for the ER. We classify ER 
visits using each ER visit’s category. The first type isolates visits that are related to accidents or 
injuries. All other visits are considered as non-injury visits.13 Our fixed-effects estimates suggest 
that the reduction in ER visits at the end of the benefit month is driven by injury-related category 
in which the timing of care is not discretionary (Table 1-9). Taken as a whole, Tables 1-8 and 1-9 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the benefit cycle changes households’ consumption, which 
in turn affects health and ER utilization.  
1.5 Evidence from Food Expenditures Data 
In order to determine whether the changes in medical care utilization that we identify in the 
previous section are likely to be a result of the SNAP benefit cycle, we investigate how cash and 
SNAP spending on food change over the course of the month using data from the FoodAPS. 
The National Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) is a nationally 
representative survey containing the daily food acquisitions of households over a seven day period 
between April 2012 and January 2013. Respondents record food acquisitions in two diaries: a food 
 
 
13 These include Diagnosis or treatment; Psychotherapy; Follow-up or Post-Operative; Immunization or Shots; 
Pregnancy-related; or other. 
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at home (FAH) diary and food away from home (FAFH) diary. In both diaries, households were 
asked to record the person that acquired the food, as well as the payment type, which indicates 
whether SNAP benefits or “out-of-pocket” income was used to make the transaction. The initial 
FoodAPS interview took place prior to the start of the seven-day diary, in most cases the day before 
the first diary day. During this interview, households were asked the date they last received their 
SNAP benefits. Using this date and the diary dates, we calculated the number of days since 
receiving benefits. We aggregate food purchasing events separately for mothers and fathers by 
weeks of the benefit month and create week of the benefit month indicators corresponding to days 
0–5, 6–13, 14–22, and 23–30 (see the supplementary appendix for details on the FoodAPS data 
and sample construction).14 
We separately analyze SNAP and cash purchasing patterns for two-parent and single-parent 
SNAP participating households using the following linear model: 
ln(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = � 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖4
𝑖𝑖=2
+  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖′𝜓𝜓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1-7) 
where 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is parent 𝑖𝑖’s food purchase in benefit week 𝑤𝑤, 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are binary indicators for the week of 
the benefit month, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of covariates including individual and family-level 
demographic variables, and environmental measures of access to restaurants and grocery markets. 
We estimate equation (1-7) separately by the type of income used to purchase food (i.e., SNAP 
benefits vs. cash income).15,16  
 
 
14 We test the sensitivity of our estimates to different definitions of benefit weeks, and come to similar conclusions. 
In particular, we also estimate our models with the following indicators: 0–5, 6–11, 12–20, and 21–30; 0–6, 7–13, 
14–20, and 21–30. Likewise, we specify a set of six indicators corresponding to days 0, 1–3, 4–6, 7–14, 15–21, and 
22–30. 
15 We obtain identical results when we estimate the model using a second set of dependent variables, constructed by 
dividing the food expenditures by household size. 
16 Because some households do not purchase food in certain weeks, the dependent variable in equation (7) is 
sometimes zero. In order to account for the decision to make a purchase food during a given week, we use a two-part 
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 Table 1-10 contains these estimates for mothers and fathers in two-parent households as 
well as female headed single-parent households with children. First, we find that the propensity of 
mothers to spend SNAP benefits on food drops significantly from the week of benefit receipt to 
the last week of the benefit month. This is true for both two-parent and single-parent households, 
but two-parent households exhibit a more pronounced cyclical pattern in their SNAP spending. 
While two-parent households reduce their purchases of food with SNAP benefits by 15.9% in the 
third week of the benefit month and by 53.7% in the fourth week of the benefit month, the reduction 
in SNAP benefit spending by mothers in single-parent households is only statistically significant 
in the last week of the benefit month and equal to 16.8%. Although the point estimates suggest a 
decline in SNAP benefit spending by fathers in two-parent households, none of the effects are 
precisely estimated. Importantly, both mothers and fathers in two-parent households increase their 
cash spending on food purchases towards the end of the benefit month, but single-parent 
households spend cash income smoothly over the month. These results provide evidence that the 
SNAP benefit cycle is the reason for the change in the use of medical services. 
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
We find that SNAP households are less likely to visit outpatient providers, dentists, and the ER at 
the end of the benefit month. However, only two-parent households experience cycles in medical 
care utilization related to SNAP payments. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
mothers in two-parent households will overspend SNAP benefits at the beginning of the month. 
This strategic behavior persuades fathers to contribute more cash income to buy food at the end of 
the month. We find empirical evidence of this behavior when we analyze food purchases across 
 
 
model (Jones 2000). The first part of the two-part model estimates the probability of having positive food 
expenditure in a given week (the extensive margin), while the second part estimates the level of food expenditure 
conditional on having positive spending (the intensive margin). 
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the benefit month. Holding the household income constant, higher cash income spending on food 
at the end of the month in two-parent households compels them to spend less on non-food goods, 
such as medical care, at the end of the benefit month. This is presumably so they can reallocate 
cash income to food at the end of the benefit month.  
In order for this behavior to be rational, it must be the case that cash income is spent on 
medical visits when care is received. Cost-sharing for low-income individuals is often in the form 
of copayments, which have to be paid at the time of service. Based on data from the 2010 MEPS, 
we find that approximately 27% of outpatient visits by SNAP participants were subject to 
copayment requirements.17 This rate is higher (37%) among SNAP recipients who were not 
enrolled in Medicaid. The average copayments for these two groups are $37 and $54, respectively, 
and the median level of copayments is $20 and $25, respectively. While these copayments are 
significantly less than the total cost of care, a growing body of research has found that even 
relatively small copayment levels are associated with reduced utilization of services (Newhouse 
and Rand Corporation Insurance Experiment Group 1993; Chandra et al. 2010, 2014). In addition, 
there are other costs of visiting medical providers, such as transportation costs, and the need to 
reduce paid work time, which may be larger than copayment amounts. For example, low-income 
workers are less likely to have paid sick leave than higher income workers (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2017).  
One would expect such an effect to be relevant for medical visits in which the timing of care 
is discretionary. The fact that individuals in two-parent SNAP households also reduce their ER 
 
 
17 In MEPS, we do not directly observe whether out-of-pocket payments represent copayments or coinsurance, but 
we are able to identify whether an out-of-pocket payment is a copayment in about 90 percentage of cases by 
analyzing the payment values. For example, if we observe a nominal amount or a flat fee across the year for 
different visits we classify these payments as a copayments. If the payment is a conventional percentage of the total 
cost of the visit cost, we classify it as a coinsurance amount.  
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visits at the end of the benefit month suggests that the income channel is not the only mechanism 
for our findings. Moreover, we find evidence that the reduction in ER visits is driven by emergent 
injury-related visits and does not differ by insurance status. We thus conclude that the SNAP 
benefit cycle affects ER visits indirectly by reducing certain types of consumption which affect 
the need for emergency care. 
Finally, we find that that the reduction in medical care utilization in two-parent SNAP 
households at the end of the benefit month is particular to adults. This may reflect a desire by 
SNAP households to protect children from reductions in consumption at the end of the month. A 
second possible interpretation is that fewer children are subject to copayment requirements in 
comparison to adults. Using the 2010 MEPS, we find that 35% of outpatient visits by adults with 
any type of insurance coverage were subject to upfront copayment requirements, only 12% of 
visits for children had copayments. In addition, medical visits by children are exempt from 
Medicaid copayment requirements, although states can set copayment levels to nominal amounts 
in separate CHIP programs. 
Our study has some limitations that must be recognized. First, our bivariate model uses a 
state-level variable (whether the state operates SNAP call centers) for identification. Although we 
have included other state-level controls in our model to reduce the potential for policy endogeneity, 
the validity of the exclusion restriction in the bivariate probit is ultimately untestable. However, 
we are reassured that estimates from the FE model, which does not require an exclusion restriction 
for identification, support our findings from the bivariate probit. Finally, prior studies demonstrate 
that SNAP participation is often under-reported in household surveys. We have conducted a 
sensitivity analysis to determine whether our results are sensitive to such measurement error. The 
25 
results of this test suggest that our qualitative findings are not the result of measurement error, but 
measurement error may still affect the magnitudes of our estimated marginal effects.  
Despite these limitations, we believe that our study makes an important contribution to the 
literature on the SNAP benefit cycle, and has implications for public policy. First, enrollment in 
SNAP leads to overall greater use of medical services, which suggests that households entering 
SNAP reallocate some of the cash income previously spent on food to medical care. However, the 
pattern of spending within the benefit month differs for two-parent and single-parent households. 
In particular, two-parent households are more likely to delay seeking medical care at the end of 
the benefit month than single-parent SNAP households or non-SNAP households. This is 
concerning because the delay of needed medical care can have serious negative health 
consequences (Begley et al. 1994; Rubin and Mendelson 1995; Zweifel and Manning 2000; Hsu 
et al. 2006). 
One potential solution is to institute mechanisms designed to smooth consumption over the 
SNAP benefit month, such as the more frequent disbursement of benefit payments, in two-parent 
households. For example, several states pay out TANF benefits twice each month, and one study 
finds that this is associated with less domestic violence around the time of TANF benefit receipt 
in those states (Hsu 2017). Our results suggest that such policies would have little effect in single-
parent households, but could improve outcomes in two-parent households. However, the benefits 
of the more frequent distribution of small SNAP payments would need to be weighed against 
potential costs, or other mechanisms would need to be put in place to reduce those costs. One 
concern is that such payments could increase the cost of grocery shopping by making it more 
difficult for SNAP households to buy in bulk at the beginning of the month. They could also 
necessitate more shopping trips, which would increase transportation costs.  
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Finally, our study also adds to the literature on the potential negative consequences of cost 
sharing for medical services in low-income households. The SNAP benefit cycle represents one 
type of liquidity constraint that household can face at a certain point in time. Prior research has 
shown that with individuals face such constraints they may delay needed medical care (Weissman 
et al. 1991; Wisk and Whitney 2012; KFF 2005). Future studies may wish to consider whether 
reductions in copayments at the end of the SNAP benefit month might counteract the reduction in 
medical care utilization associated with the SNAP benefit cycle.  
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35 
Table 1-3. End of the benefit month effect on medical care utilization among SNAP participants 
 
Outpatient Emergency room Dental Inpatient 
Any visit     
   wgt × two-parent -0.001 -0.011*** -0.007 0.002 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) 
 0.300 0.051 0.072 0.023 
Observations  179,724 179,724 179,724 179,724 
     
Log of number of visits     
   wgt × two-parent -0.008 -0.009*** -0.006* 0.001 
 (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
     
Observations  179,724 179,724 179,724 179,724 
     
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls and state characteristics. Standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the state-level. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 
0.1. 
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Table 1-9. Fixed-effects estimates on ER visits, by visit category 
 Two-parent  Single-parent 
 Injury  Non-injury   Injury  Non-injury  
Full-sample       
   SNAP 0.002 -0.018**  0.001 -0.020* 
 (0.002) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.010) 
   SNAP×wgt -0.005** 0.009  0.001 0.004 
    (0.002) (0.009)  (0.003) (0.011) 
Average outcome 0.028 0.020  0.042 0.028 
Observations 158,840 158,840  103,056 103,056 
      
Adults      
   SNAP 0.002** -0.015  0.003 -0.034** 
 (0.001) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.016) 
   SNAP×wgt -0.006** 0.009  0.004 0.008 
    (0.003) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.019) 
Observations 71088 71088  35,116 35,116 
      
Children       
   SNAP 0.002 -0.021*  0.001 -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.012) 
   SNAP×wgt -0.004 0.006  -0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.014)  (0.003) (0.013) 
Observations 87,752 87,752  67,940 67,940 
      
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls and state characteristics. Standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the state-level. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 
0.1. 
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Table 1-10. Estimates of food spending patterns over the SNAP benefit month by payment type  
  Single-parent Two-parent Two-parent 
  Mother Father Mother 
Total 
Spending week 2 -0.044 0.097 -0.061 
  (0.262) (0.265) (0.398) 
 week 3  -0.120 0.052 -0.608 
  (0.365) (0.291) (0.394) 
 week 4 -0.374 0.386 -0.357 
  (0.286) (0.305) (0.395) 
SNAP 
spending week 2 -0.273 -0.194 -0.614 
  (0.247) (0.181) (0.409) 
 week 3  -0.404 -0.209 -0.159 *** 
  (0.299) (0.210) (0.067) 
 week 4 -0.168** -0.174 -0.537*** 
  (0.085) (0.250) (0.242) 
Non –SNAP 
spending  week 2 0.203 0.373 0.532 
  (0.163) (0.228) (0.358) 
 week 3  0.216 0.405 0.110 
  (0.265) (0.252) (0.356) 
 week 4 0.024 0.675*** 0.691* 
  (0.230) (0.228) (0.355) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household-level.  
Significance level: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
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Appendix A. SNAP Eligibility 
To be eligible for the SNAP, a household has to pass gross income, net income, and asset tests. 
Since our data does not contain information on household assets, we simulate the gross income, 
and net income tests to determine households’ eligibility status (USDA, 2016a,c).18 However, 
only 3% of households who apply for SNAP benefits fail the asset test (Wheaton et al. 2016).  
The gross monthly income limits and net monthly income limits are set at 130 percent and 
100 percent of the poverty level for the household size, respectively (USDA, 2016b).19 In 
accordance with eligibility rules, we exempt households from the gross income test if they are an 
SSI recipient due to a disability or any household member is 60 years of age or older. To pass the 
net income test, a number of deductions are allowed. Households are able to deduct dependent 
care expenses and shelter costs (USDA, 2016a). The MEPS does not contain information on 
housing costs or child care payments, so we impute this information using state-level average 
market rate charges for child care at child care centers from the National Women’s Law Center 
(Schulman and Blank 2014) and average monthly shelter expenses from Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (Rosenbaum et al. 2002).  Able bodied adults without dependents (ABAWD) are 
required to work or participate in a work program for at least 20 hours per week in order to receive 
SNAP benefits for more than 3 months in a 36-month period. States may request to waive the 
ABAWD time limit in areas with an unemployment rate above 10 percent or a lack of sufficient 
 
 
18  When estimating panel data models, we define the eligibility status based on the first-year observation of 
individuals. 
19 Monthly income eligibility standards for 1996-2003 were obtained from USDA/FNS. 
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job opportunities. We do not have data on ABAWD waivers, so we exclude ABAWDs who work 
less than 20 hours per week from our sample. 
Appendix B. Measurement Error Adjusted SNAP Measure 
In this section, we explore the possibility that our results are confounded by measurement error in 
self-reported SNAP participation. To do this we use data on state-level rates of SNAP participation 
from SNAP Data System to construct an error-adjusted measure of SNAP participation. 
First, we estimate a state-level regression of the state SNAP participation rate on state-level 
measures of demographic composition and socio-economic status, the unemployment rate, and the 
poverty rate from the U.S. Census Bureau, as well as state-level SNAP policies determining 
eligibility criteria, recertification and reporting requirements, benefit issuance methods, 
availability of online applications, use of biometric technology (such as fingerprinting), and 
coordination with other low-income assistance programs from the SNAP Policy Database. 20  
We subsequently use this model to predict SNAP participation for individuals in the MEPS 
who are eligible for SNAP, but do not report participating in the program. In order to make this 
prediction, we use the individual’s demographic information, but the state-level information from 
the individual’s state of residence for the other state-level measures. We reclassify eligible 
individuals who did not report participating in SNAP in the MEPS with the highest predicted 
participation levels as SNAP participants. We do this until the rate of SNAP participation in the 
MEPS equals the national rate of SNAP participation in each year.21  
 
 
 
20 State-level measures of demographic composition and socioeconomic status include age categories (0-5, 6-13, 14-
17, 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65 and older), educational attainment (college degree or higher, high school diploma, below 
high school), race and ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, and other races), and per capita income. 
21 Time-series data on individual level rate of SNAP participation available at:  
https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap 
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Appendix C. The National Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey  
The National Food Acquisition and Purchase Survey (FoodAPS) is a nationally representative 
survey containing the daily food acquisitions of households over a seven day period between April 
2012 and January 2013. Respondents record food acquisitions in two diaries: a food at home (FAH) 
diary and food away from home (FAFH) diary. In general, FAH includes food obtained from 
grocery stores, farmers’ markets, food pantries, and home gardens, while FAFH includes food 
purchased at sit-down restaurants, fast-food establishments and take-away restaurants. For the 
FAH diary, households were asked to scan UP codes, either on the food package or provided in 
the diary for loose/bulk items, and to write down the total expenditure for that shopping trip. 
Similarly, households provided the total expenditure for every FAFH purchase, and were asked to 
write down each item purchased. In both diaries, households were also asked to provide the receipt 
if one was given. Importantly, households record the person that acquired the food, as well as the 
payment type, which indicates whether SNAP benefits or “out-of-pocket” income was used to 
make the transaction. In all our analyses, we use the sum of the total expenditures for each event 
for FAH and FAFH by diary day. Of the 4,826 households surveyed, 1,581 households had at least 
one member currently enrolled in SNAP.   
Because we are interested in the spending patterns of SNAP households, we estimate our 
models on households with at least one member currently enrolled in SNAP. We further restrict 
our sample to households with at least one child under age 18 and exclude households with a parent 
younger than age 20 or older than age 50, as our analyses with the MEPS data. Our final sample 
consists of 535 two-parent, and 908 single-parent SNAP households.22 
 
 
22 Because there are 84 male-headed households with children, and only 20 households have nonzero weekly food 
purchase, we subset to female-headed households when analyzing single-parent households. 
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The initial FoodAPS interview took place prior to the start of the seven-day diary, in most 
cases the day before the first diary day. During this interview, households were asked the date they 
last received their SNAP benefits. Using this date and the diary dates, we calculated the number 
of days since receiving benefits. Day zero indicates the day of benefit arrival and day 30 is the last 
possible day of the cycle. We aggregate food purchasing events separately for mothers and fathers 
by weeks of the benefit month and create week of the benefit month indicators corresponding to 
days 0–5, 6–13, 14–22, and 23–30.23 
The control variables we include from FoodAPS are age and its square, race and ethnicity 
(Hispanic, black, and other race with white as the omitted category), region (South, Midwest, and 
West with Northeast omitted), urban residence, education (high school diploma, any college, with 
less than a high school degree omitted), number of children in the household, the log of total family 
income normalized by the square root of household size, and whether the household pays monthly 
rent for their residential unit. We also include a number of controls to capture the local food 
environment, such as the number of grocery stores, fast food restaurants, other restaurants within 
a mile, and distance to nearest SNAP-authorized Walmart. Table 1-E-1 contains descriptive 
statistics of all the variables we use in our FoodAPS analysis. 
  
 
 
23 We test the sensitivity of our estimates to different definitions of benefit weeks and come to similar conclusions. 
In particular, we also estimate our models with the following indicators: 0–5, 6–11, 12–20, and 21–30; 0–6, 7–13, 
14–20, and 21–30. Likewise, we specify a set of six indicators corresponding to days 0, 1–3, 4–6, 7–14, 15–21, and 
22–30. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
How the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Affects 
Labor Force Decisions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp 
Program) is the largest public assistance program in the United States. While fewer than 10 million 
low-income individuals participated in the program in the early 1970’s, by 2016, more than 44 
million individuals were enrolled in SNAP (USDA 2018). Most analyses of the impact of 
expanding SNAP caseloads focus on the direct costs of the program from increased program 
expenditures and the direct benefits from improved food security. In this article, we consider 
whether enrollment in SNAP facilitates labor market participation. Given the increasing number 
of SNAP participants, this indirect effect of the program could result in large welfare gains.  
Safety net programs are designed to ensure a basic level of consumption in low-income 
families. Consequently, programs such as SNAP feature a guaranteed benefit level if the family 
has no income. As earnings or income increase, benefits are reduced at the legislated benefit 
reduction rate. Because of the link between labor income and benefit receipt from government 
assistance programs, standard economic theory suggests that cash and in-kind transfer programs 
will reduce labor supply (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2012). For example, a low-income worker 
may stop working after enrollment in a welfare program. Likewise, a low-paid worker may have 
little incentive to work more hours or seek higher wages, because the extra earnings from doing 
so may be partially offset by a benefit reduction.  
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Although SNAP benefits have the structure of a traditional income support program, the 
reduction rate in SNAP is substantially lower than is specified in other safety net programs 
(Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2015).24 SNAP recipients are allotted a benefit amount equal to the 
difference between the federally defined maximum allotment for a given family size and the 
amount that the family is deemed to be able to afford to pay for food on its own according to the 
benefit formula (essentially 30 percent of cash income, minus some deductions). For example, in 
2015, a two-member household received a maximum SNAP benefit of $357 per month, and a four-
member household could receive at most $649 per month. Based on the SNAP benefit calculation 
formula, SNAP households are financially better off if they are able to secure employment or 
increase their earnings.  
There are a number of potential channels through which SNAP participation could increase 
employment and hours worked. For example, SNAP participation may increase employment 
indirectly by allowing recipients to pay for job-related expenses, like childcare or transportation. 
This is supported by the findings that show SNAP reduces nonfood hardships (Han, 2016). 
Alternatively, if SNAP participation leads to increases in the quality or quantity of food, labor 
supply and productivity could improve through better nutrition (Strauss, 1986; Sahn and 
Alderman, 1988). Furthermore, SNAP rules directly encourage labor supply.  
In particular, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 imposed work requirements on Able Bodied Adults Without Dependents 
 
 
24 The benefit reduction rate in the AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) program was 100% by 1967. It 
was reduced to 67% in 1967, then increased again to 100% in 1981. Since the federal welfare reform in 1996, and the 
conversion to TANF, there has been substantial variation across states in the program’s benefit reduction rate. In 
contrast, the benefit reduction rate in SNAP is 30% (Ziliak 2016). 
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(ABAWDs) who receive SNAP benefits.25 The legislation also requires provisions that encourage 
work for all participants in SNAP. As a result of the PRWORA legislation, all non-exempt 
household members participating in SNAP (with or without dependents) must meet general work 
requirements in order to remain eligible for SNAP.26 These work requirements include registering 
for work, not voluntarily quitting a job or reducing work effort below 30 hours a week, taking a 
job if offered, and participating in employment and training programs assigned by the state. Failure 
to comply with these requirements can result in disqualification from the program. While SNAP’s 
general work requirements do not restrict the enrollment of unemployed individuals, working 
participants are prevented from quitting their job if they are to maintain eligibility. As a result, 
SNAP participation could increase labor supply even though, in theory, there are work disincentive 
effects from providing unearned income to beneficiaries.  
While there is a large literature on the work incentive effects of other income transfer 
programs such as AFDC and the EITC, only a few studies consider the work incentive effects of 
SNAP, and most of the existing literature uses data prior to the PRWORA legislation.27 Fraker and 
Moffitt (1988) find that participation in AFDC and SNAP among families headed by a single 
woman reduces hours of work by 1 hour per week. Hagstrom (1996) finds small negative impacts 
of changes in the benefit amount on labor supply among married couples. However, in a review of 
 
 
25 ABAWDs are defined as those who are between 18 and 50 years of age, not responsible for a child or 
incapacitated, and medically fit for employment. See the FNS website for details: 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/able-bodied-adults-without-dependents-abawds  
26 Work requirements apply to those who are mentally and physically fit and over the age of 15 and under the age of 
60. See the FNS website for details: 
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility 
27 The literature on the labor supply effects of other income transfer programs includes analyses of Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (e.g., Moffitt, 1983), Earned Income Tax Credit (e.g., Meyer, 2002; Eissa and Hoynes, 
2004), and Social Security Disability Insurance (Bound, 1989; Parsons, 1991; Gruber and Kubik, 1997; Chen and 
van der Klaauw, 2008; Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 2013; French and Song, 2014). 
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these and subsequent studies Moffitt (2002) concludes that SNAP participation results in few work 
disincentives. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) exploit variation in county-level initial program 
rollout to control for selection into the program and find that participation in SNAP reduces 
employment and hours worked among families headed by single women. 
This early research on the effects of enrollment in the SNAP on labor supply suggests that 
SNAP participation discourages work. All of research on SNAP and labor supply following the 
passage of PRWORA investigates the effect of work requirements on ABAWDs and the findings 
are inconclusive. While Cuffey, Mykerezi, and Beatty (2018) find that SNAP work requirement 
waivers decrease employment among ABAWDs most likely to participate in SNAP, two studies 
find no significant employment effects (Ritter, 2018; Stacy, Scherpf, and Jo, 2018). However, 
ABAWDS comprise less than 9 percent of all SNAP participants. Furthermore, as Beatty and 
Tuttle (2015) note, SNAP has evolved considerably since its rollout and there are reasons to believe 
that pre-PRWORA studies on the full SNAP population no longer accurately characterize 
participants’ labor supply behavior. This is because changes in work requirements, eligibility, and 
program administration may have altered the characteristics of the population served by SNAP, 
and the work incentives faced by enrollees. Moreover, the role of women in the labor force has 
changed substantially over this period, which could also result in a different impact on labor supply 
decisions by participants. For example, Rosenbaum (2013) argues that SNAP participation does 
not generate work disincentives among recipients, but this study is largely descriptive, and it is 
unclear whether causal methods would lead to the same conclusion.  
This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the causal relationship 
between participation in SNAP and labor supply over the past two decades. Similar to Bronchetti, 
Christensen, and Hoynes (2018), our approach leverages plausibly exogenous variation in the real 
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value of maximum allotment of SNAP benefits for identification. Specifically, we use the ratio of 
maximum SNAP allotment to the food price faced by a household as an instrument for SNAP 
participation. Although food prices vary substantially across regions in the U.S., SNAP benefits 
are fixed. Based on data from the Quarterly Food at Home Price Database, regional food prices 
vary from 70 to 90 percent of the national average at the low end to 120 to 140 percent at the high 
end of the distribution, which creates variation in the real of SNAP benefits across regions 
(Bronchetti, Christensen, and Hoynes 2018). More importantly, these regional differences change 
over time, with some areas experiencing larger increases in SNAP purchasing power, and others 
experiencing smaller increases. In addition, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) of 2009 led to an unprecedented increase in maximum benefit levels for participant 
households (Beatty and Tuttle, 2015), which creates another source of identifying variation during 
the sample period.  
We find that SNAP enrollment increases labor supply, suggesting that the expansion in 
SNAP helped to boost labor force participation in low-income households. We also find evidence 
that the increase in employment from SNAP participation is not solely due to work requirements 
but results from other mechanisms as well. These results are relevant to policy debates on the labor 
supply implications of public assistance programs and associated work requirements. Given that 
SNAP participation results in higher employment through multiple mechanisms, it is unclear 
whether imposing stricter work requirements would meaningfully affect the employment rate of 
participants.  
2.2 Empirical Approach 
In order to estimate the impact of SNAP participation on employment decisions, we use the 
following estimating equation:  
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𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), (2-1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the labor market outcome of interest for individual 𝑖𝑖 who resides in market 𝑚𝑚 in year 
𝑡𝑡, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the measure of SNAP participation. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of covariates including 
individual and family-level demographic and socioeconomic variables, self-reported health status 
and a measure of disability.  
We estimate both a discrete measure of participation in SNAP and a continuous measure of 
the SNAP benefit level. The discrete variable equals zero if individuals are non-participants in 
SNAP and equals one if individuals are participants. The continuous measure is the natural 
logarithm of SNAP benefits, which we set equal to zero for those who are not enrolled in SNAP. 
These distinct specifications allow us to distinguish between the average effect of SNAP 
participation and the marginal effect of an additional dollar of benefit on employment decisions. 
For both measures, we must account for the endogeneity of the SNAP variable to get 
consistent estimates of our outcomes of interest (Meyerhoefer and Yang 2011). Endogeneity of 
the discrete measure of SNAP participation is caused by adverse selection of individuals with 
lower SES or health status into SNAP. Along with concerns regarding selection into the program, 
our estimates for the continuous treatment specification suffer from simultaneity bias. This is 
because benefits are reduced, when labor market earnings increase. We identify the causal effect 
of SNAP using instrument variables, exogenous variation in federally determined benefit levels 
over time to account for both self-selection into SNAP and simultaneity bias. 
2.2.1 Identification 
Our identification strategy relies on quasi-experimental variation in the purchasing power of the 
maximum expected SNAP benefit. Evidence suggest that existing adjustments for the cost of living 
through allowed deductions in SNAP benefit formula are not sufficient to equalize the real value 
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of benefits (Leibtag 2007; Todd, Leibtag and Penberthy 2011; Bronchetti, Christensen and Hoynes 
2018). As a result, households living in areas of the country with food prices that are higher than 
the national average must supplement their food purchases with cash to a greater extent. By 
implication, variation in the purchasing power of SNAP benefits will affect individuals’ enrollment 
decisions. All else equal, individuals living in low-cost areas will have higher real benefits, and a 
greater incentive to enroll in SNAP than those living in high cost areas. While the SNAP benefit 
level received by a household is endogenous to household members’ employment decisions, 
variation in the real value of the maximum benefit allotment is plausibly exogenous, because it is 
determined by federal program rules, and regional food prices.  
We use the ratio of the maximum allotment of SNAP benefits based on household 
composition to the regional food price as an instrument for SNAP participation. This ratio will be 
larger in low cost areas than high cost areas, providing a greater incentive for SNAP participation 
in the former. However, low cost areas may be different from high cost areas in ways that affect 
labor force participation rates. In order to distinguish SNAP purchasing power from the broader 
effects of living in a more or less expensive market, we include market-by-year fixed-effects in 
our models. In addition, we control for regional price parities, the consumer price index, and the 
price of housing. We also include state-level per-capita income, poverty rate, minimum wage 
requirements, and educational attainment to control for regional socio-economic characteristics.  
The equation for our endogenous variable is non-linear in regional food prices. Without any 
adjustment to the ratio of maximum SNAP allotment to food price, this non-linearity would largely 
eliminate the ability of additive fixed-effects to account for unobservable shocks and differential 
trends in food prices across market regions. We therefore construct our instrument in two steps. 
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First, the regional food price is regressed on market-by-year characteristics. Letting 𝑚𝑚 denote food 
market groups, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denote the market’s food basket price in year 𝑡𝑡, we estimate: 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, (2-2) 
across food market groups and time using linear regression. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are market area and year 
fixed-effects. Second, the residuals of this regression are retained and used to construct the 
instrument. We add residuals from this regression to the intercept to calculate the purchasing power 
of households’ maximum allotment across market groups (Chen and Ravallion 1996). Variation 
in these residuals should be mostly due to local demand and supply shocks. For example, several 
studies argue that the entry of Walmart in the supermarket industry significantly changed 
competition in retail food product markets and prices (Matsa, 2011; Hausman and Leibtag, 2007; 
Basker and Noel, 2009). 
Since we include market fixed-effects in our models, the identifying variation comes from 
differences across the market areas in food price trends. Additionally, in 2009, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) increased maximum allotment of benefits by 13.6% for 
a SNAP household, which creates another source of exogenous variation in the instrument. As we 
discuss in the section on empirical results, the latter source of variation in our instrument is 
particularly important to account for simultaneity bias in order to identify the effect of changes in 
the continuous measure of SNAP benefits. The maximum allotment of SNAP benefits also varies 
according to the size of the household. Since the change in household size might be endogenous 
to SNAP participation, we control for household composition in all our models. 
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2.2.2 Econometric Models 
Discrete measure of SNAP participation: To identify the causal effect of SNAP 
participation on employment, we estimate a recursive bivariate probit model. The first equation in 
the model predicts SNAP participation and the second equation, which is a function of SNAP 
participation, predicts employment status as follows: Pr (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖), (2-3) Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1)=Φ(𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖), (2-4) 
where Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is employment status, 
and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the real value of the maximum SNAP benefit allotment as discussed in section 2.1, and 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of state and market characteristics The main effect of interest in this model is the 
marginal effect of SNAP participation on employment. 
Continuous measure of SNAP benefit level: We estimate the following conditional 
(recursive) mixed process model that includes a censored regression (Tobit) for our endogenous 
variable, the logarithm of SNAP benefits (we observe a positive benefit amount only if individuals 
are SNAP participants), and a second equation for employment status among SNAP-eligible 
individuals: 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌0 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (2-5) Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) =Φ(𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜑𝜑1 + 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜌𝜌1 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖), (2-6) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log of SNAP benefits. 
In addition, we modify both the model indicated in equations (2-3), (2-4), and the model 
indicated in equations (2-5), (2-6) to investigate whether SNAP causes transitions between full-
time and part-time employment. First, we create three categories of weekly hours worked: less 
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than 30 hours a week, between 30 and 40 hours a week, and at least 40 hours a week (full-time). 
When the log of SNAP benefits is the regressor of interest, we estimate a conditional mixed process 
model that uses a tobit model to predict the log of SNAP benefits, and an ordered probit model to 
predict full-time versus part-time work status among SNAP-eligible individuals. Likewise, we 
estimate a conditional mixed process model that uses a probit regression for SNAP participation, 
and an ordered probit to determine full-time versus part-time work status. In both cases, the error 
terms of the recursive model are assumed to be correlated (Roodman 2018). 
2.3 Data 
We use two data sources to determine how participation in SNAP affects labor force decisions. 
The main source of variation in our instrument, regional food prices, comes from USDA’s 
Quarterly Food At Home Price Database (QFAHPD). Our outcome variables and many of our 
control variables come from the 1999-2010 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  
2.3.1 The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
The MEPS is a nationally representative household survey of the US civilian noninstitutionalized 
population. Each panel of respondents was interviewed in five rounds covering two calendar years. 
MEPS contains detailed information on household and individual demographic characteristics, 
socioeconomic status, health status, and labor force participation. The MEPS contains several key 
variables that are useful for our analysis. MEPS respondents are asked whether anyone in the 
household received some amount of SNAP benefits in the past year, for how many months, and 
the monthly value of the benefit. We subset our sample to individuals aged 18-64 years. 
We use the data in MEPS to construct a group of SNAP-eligible households. To be eligible 
for the SNAP, a household has to pass gross income, net income, and asset tests. The net income 
calculation requires subtracting certain deductions from a household’s basic (or gross) monthly 
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income. Since our data do not contain information on household assets and allowed deductions, 
we simulate gross income to determine households’ eligibility status (we define the eligibility 
status based on the first-year observation of individuals). Given our focus on non-elderly adults, 
this limitation should not lead to substantial errors in defining eligibility. In contrast, the asset test 
or net income test could be important for a sample that includes a large proportion of elderly 
members (Gundersen and Offutt, 2005; Haider, Jacknowitz, and Schoeni, 2003). SNAP eligibility 
is formally restricted to those with gross household incomes at or below 130% of the federal 
poverty level based on household size (USDA 2016a).28  
2.3.2 The Quarterly Food-at-Home Price Database 
In order to construct a regional food price to calculate the real value of maximum SNAP benefits, 
we use the 1999-2010 Quarterly Food-at-Home Price Database (QFAHPD). The QFAHPD is 
constructed using Nielsen Homescan data and contains the average quarterly price per 100 grams 
for 52 food groups within a geographic market group. The dataset includes such food groups as 
fresh and frozen dark-green vegetables, low-fat milk, packaged whole-grain products, and 
carbonated nonalcoholic beverages. A geographic market group consists of either a single 
metropolitan area (such as Philadelphia, Boston, or Los Angeles), grouped metro areas (such as 
metro Ohio, which includes Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus), or other groups of counties. A 
total of 35 geographic market groups cover the contiguous United States between 2002 and 2010, 
and 30 market groups cover 1999-2001. For consistency, we use 30 market groups throughout our 
study period. 
 
 
28 Monthly income eligibility standards for 1996-2003 were obtained from USDA/FNS. 
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We follow Gregory and Coleman-Jensen (2013) and Bronchetti, Christensen, and Hoynes 
(2018) to create a food basket price for each market and year during 1999-2010 in two steps. First, 
we map the QFAHPD food categories to the 29 TFP food group prices in the market basket using 
an expenditure-weighted average of the prices for the QFAHPD foods, where the weights are the 
fraction of yearly national expenditures in the TFP category for the QFAHPD good. Once we have 
constructed the region-by-year price for 29 TFP food groups, we calculate our basket price based 
on the Thrifty Food Plan (TFP) for a family of four comprised of two adults and two children. The 
USDA’s TFP defines a representative healthful and minimal cost diet with limited resources and 
is used to define the Maximum SNAP allotment. 
We assign the market region-by-year TFP prices to households in the MEPS based on the 
household’s county of residence. We then measure the purchasing power of SNAP benefits using 
the ratio of the maximum SNAP benefit to the TFP price faced by the household.29 Figure 2-1, 
Panel A shows the quarterly-level mean of variation in SNAP purchasing power for a four member 
family across the U.S. from 1999 to 2010 as well as the minimum and maximum levels of 
purchasing power. SNAP purchasing power varies significantly across areas rising in all areas with 
the ARRA. Figure 2-1, Panel B illustrates the variation in SNAP purchasing power using 
regression adjusted TFP prices as discussed in the identification section. As with the unadjusted 
prices, there is moderate regional variation in SNAP purchasing power in all years, with the largest 
change resulting from the increase in SNAP benefits due to the ARRA. 
 
 
29 Allotments are adjusted for food price inflation annually, each October, to reflect the cost of the TFP in the 
immediately previous June. We use the weighted average of monthly amounts to obtain the allotment for each calendar 
year. We obtained maximum allotment amounts for 1999-2004 from USDA/FNS. 
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2.3.3 Control Variables 
We control for a full set of socio-demographic characteristics and health status variables in our 
models. Our main control variables include dichotomous indicators for age (30–39, 40–50, 51–64, 
with age 18–29 as the omitted category), gender, race and ethnicity (Hispanic, black, and other 
race, with white as the omitted category), region (South, Midwest, and West with Northeast 
omitted), urban residence, education (high school diploma, any college, with less than a high 
school degree omitted), family size, number of children in the household (under age 5, 5-18), 
whether the household has a disabled member, whether the household has an elderly member30, 
and the log of income earned by other family members normalized by the square root of household 
size. In order to control for health status, we use self-reported mental and physical health (poor/fair 
health in all rounds, poor/fair health in some rounds, excellent health in some rounds, excellent 
health in all rounds, good/very good health in all rounds, and self-reported health is missing, with 
good/very good health in some rounds serving as the omitted category for both mental and physical 
health) and a measure of disability status. The latter is a binary variable that indicates whether the 
person had an IADL (Instrumental Activities of Daily Living) or ADL (Activities of Daily Living), 
functional, activity, or sensory limitation in any interview round.  
In addition, we include state-level per-capita income, poverty rate, minimum wage 
requirements, and educational attainment (percentage of bachelor’s degree for persons 25 years of 
age and older) to control for socio-economic characteristics; state-level housing cost, and market-
level price parities to control for the differences in overall price levels, and the CPI for the four 
census regions to control for changes in price over time. Per capita income, poverty rate, and 
 
 
30 Households are exempt from the gross income test if they are an SSI recipient or if any household member is 60 
years of age or older. 
61 
 
 
 
educational attainment were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, state minimum wages and the 
census CPI comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the housing cost measure was obtained 
from Freddie Mac31, and state price parities are calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
In our conditional sample of working adults, we also control for employment characteristics. 
These include union status, employer size (between 100-500 employees, more than 500 
employees, with less than 100 employees as the omitted category), benefits provided by the 
employer (retirement plan, and paid vacations), a white-collar occupation indicator, and industry 
indicators.32 
Table 2-C-1 lists summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. These 
statistics show clear selection into SNAP by individuals with lower incomes, less education, poorer 
health status, and higher rates of disability. Importantly, our summary measures indicate that labor 
force participation rates among SNAP recipients are lower than those who do not receive benefits.  
2.4 Main Results 
We begin by estimating alternative first stage models in order to demonstrate how our models are 
identified and highlight the importance of controlling for differences in overall price levels and 
other time invariant factors across market areas. First, we estimate first stage models for SNAP 
participation and the log of SNAP benefits on our sample of SNAP eligible individuals with and 
without market fixed effects.33 These models contain all of the control variables listed in Table 
2-C-1, which include three variables to control for changes in non-food prices over time (regional 
 
 
31 The annual home price index is the average of the monthly home price indices, by state, published by Freddie Mac 
as the Freddie Mac Home Price Index (FMHPI), found at http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/ fmhpi/. 
32 The industry indicators include: 1. natural resources/mining/construction/manufacturing; 2. wholesale and retail 
trade/transportation and utilities; 3. professional and business services/education, health, and social services; 4. other 
services/public administration/military/unclassifiable industry.  
33 We set the SNAP benefit level equal to $1 for individuals who are eligible for, but do not participate in SNAP. 
62 
 
 
 
CPI, state price parities, and state housing price index). The coefficient on our instrument, the 
maximum SNAP allotment divided by the TFP-derived price, and the F-statistic of the instrument 
are reported in Table 2-1. In both the models for SNAP participation and SNAP benefits there is a 
clear downward bias in the coefficient estimates on MAX allotment/TFP price in the models 
without market fixed effects. This is because overall market-area-specific price levels, and 
possibly other area-level time-invariant unobservable factors, are negatively correlated with the 
instrument and positively correlated with SNAP participation and benefits.34 
 Next, we estimate models with an alternative instrument, the maximum SNAP allotment 
not adjustment for the TFP price. The power of this instrument is much lower than the price-
adjustment instrument in the first-stage model of SNAP participation, with the F-statistic dropping 
from 25.2 to 9.5. Because increases in the maximum SNAP allotment over time lead to increases 
in SNAP participation, this instrument nearly meets the conventional standard for adequate power 
for a continuous instrument (F = 10; Stock, wright, and Yogo 2002). However, the price-adjusted 
instrument is a much stronger predictor of SNAP participation because households make SNAP 
participation decisions based on the real value of benefits. The F-statistic in the first stage model 
of SNAP benefits also drops when the unadjusted maximum allotment is used as an instrument, 
but to a lesser extent. This is because the correlation between the two instruments and SNAP 
benefits for the sample of participating households is due solely to a correlation between benefits 
and the maximum SNAP allotment over time.  
In Table 2-2, we report the first stage estimates separately for women and men for our main 
specification with market fixed effects, and the real value of the maximum SNAP allotment as the 
 
 
34 SNAP benefits increase with overall price levels because the value of applicable deductions (compensating for 
expenses such as dependent care, excess shelter costs, and out-of-pocket medical expenses) increase. 
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instrument. The subgroup analysis by gender indicates that the purchasing power of the maximum 
SNAP allotment is statistically significant for both men and women, but the point estimate of the 
coefficient is twice as large for women. Moreover, the F-statistic associated with the excluded 
instrument after controlling for market group and year fixed effects is 37.7 for SNAP participation 
and 46.6 for the SNAP benefit level in the sample of women, but falls to 7 and 6.8, respectively, 
in the sample of men.  
In Table 2-3, we report the marginal effects from our IV model (second column), as well as 
results from a univariate probit model that does not account for the endogeneity of SNAP 
participation (first column). The first row in each panel presents results from the discrete measure 
of SNAP participation, and the second row contains marginal effect estimates for the continuous 
measure of SNAP benefits. We present results for the pooled sample, as well as the samples of 
men and women. The marginal effect from the non-IV model indicates that SNAP participation is 
associated with 10.6 percentage points (17.9%) lower likelihood of employment. We find similar 
results when we estimate the effects of the SNAP benefit level; doubling SNAP benefit (a 100% 
increase) is associated with a 1.7 percentage points (2.9%) reduction in the probability of 
employment. However, after controlling for the endogeneity of SNAP participation, we find that 
SNAP participation increases the likelihood of employment by 3.8 percentage points (6.4%) 
among low-income adults. Likewise, doubling the benefit results in a 2.7 percentage points (4.5%) 
increase in the probability of employment in the pooled sample. The downward bias on the effect 
of SNAP in the non-IV model of employment is consistent with a negative correlation between 
lower unobserved SES and employment, and a positive correlation between the lower SES and 
SNAP participation. 
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There is a noticeable difference between the labor market effects of SNAP for men and 
women. However, this may be due to the low power of the IV in the sample of men. After 
controlling for endogeneity, our results suggest that SNAP participation results in 5.5 percentage 
points (9.7%) increase in the probability of employment for women, but the effect is not 
statistically different from zero in the sample of men. Likewise, doubling the SNAP benefit 
increases the probability of employment by 3.3 percentage points (5.8%) for women in the IV 
model, but not for men.  
In Table 2-4, we investigate whether SNAP causes transitions between full-time and part-
time employment using the sample of working adults.35 The non-IV results imply that SNAP 
participation is associated with 6.4 percentage points (10.1%) lower likelihood of full-time work. 
Likewise, a 100% increase in SNAP benefits reduces the probability of working full time by 0.5 
percentage points (0.8%). These results are completely reversed in sign when the endogeneity of 
SNAP is taken into account. The marginal effects from IV models for part-time versus full-time 
employment imply that SNAP participation results in a 22 percentage point (35%) increase in full-
time rather than part-time work, and doubling the SNAP benefit increases the incentive to work 
full time by 2.9 percentage points (5%). As in the pooled sample, we find that an increase in SNAP 
benefit dollars increases the likelihood of full-time employment when we estimate separate models 
for men and women. These results suggest that SNAP appears to move people from part-time to 
full-time work. 
 
 
35 Employed individuals who had missing hours were dropped from the conditional sample of working adults. Those 
who reported working more than 120 hours per week were also excluded due to concerns over reporting error. 
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2.5 Robustness Checks and Falsification Tests 
We conduct several robustness checks of our main results. First, we re-estimate all of our models 
after excluding ABAWDs. These individuals face stricter work requirements and time limitations 
as a qualification for receiving assistance. When we exclude ABAWDs from the sample, we find 
our marginal effect estimates are very similar. This suggests that our results are not driven by this 
sub-population.36  
2.5.1 Measurement Error 
An important identification problem that arises in this study is nonrandom measurement error. 
This is because a large fraction of recipients mis-report their participation in SNAP, and as 
previous research suggests, these mis-reports mostly “false negative” reports by households that 
do not report participation, but are in fact enrolled in SNAP (Bollinger and David 1997; Meyer, 
Mok, and Sullivan 2009). In the presence of substantial reporting error in participation, drawing 
definitive conclusions about the effects of SNAP can be challenging. (Kreider et al. 2012; 
Alamada, McCarthy, and Tchernis 2016). In order to examine the possibility that our results are 
confounded by measurement error, we estimate our models after an adjustment for the mis-
classification of SNAP enrollment. We use variation in the state-level rates of SNAP participation 
to predict the likelihood of participation for SNAP-eligible households based on demographic 
information and socio-economic status. We then reclassify participation status for individuals who 
did not report participating in SNAP in the MEPS with the highest predicted participation levels 
until the rate of SNAP participation in the MEPS equals the national rate of SNAP participation in 
 
 
36 In addition to controlling for disability status in our main models, we re-estimate our models after dropping 
individuals with a disability, and find similar results. 
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each year. We describe this procedure in greater detail in the supplementary appendix. Table 2-C-
2 contains estimates from our IV models for the discrete measure of SNAP where some SNAP 
non-participants have been reclassified as participants using the method described above. The 
marginal effect of SNAP participation on employment in this adjusted model is 3.8 percentage 
points in the sample of women, which is similar to the 5.5 percent point effect from our main 
model. Although we lose power to detect effects in the full-sample after re-classifying individuals 
as SNAP participants, we are reassured that measurement error bias does not change the qualitative 
conclusions from our models. 
2.5.2 Exclusion Restriction 
In order for our models to generate consistent estimates of the impact of SNAP participation on 
employment outcomes, the instrument must be excludable from the outcome equation. In order to 
investigate the validity of our instrument, we estimate the reduced form model of employment on 
the real value of SNAP benefits among SNAP participants and compare these results to those from 
a “placebo” sample of adults whose employment decisions should not be affected by the 
purchasing power of SNAP benefits. We use non-participating SNAP eligible adults as the placebo 
sample because they are comparable (after regression adjustment) to SNAP participants. If we find 
a significant effect of the instrument on non-participating SNAP eligible adults, it would suggest 
a violation of the exclusion restriction. Table 2-C-3 contains the result of this test. As with the 
main results, we find that an increase in the purchasing power of SNAP benefits significantly raises 
the likelihood of employment (panel 1). However, we find no effect of the instrument on the 
probability of employment for SNAP-eligible adults who do not report participating in SNAP 
(panel 2). 
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2.5.3 Alternative Instrument 
Since the exogeneity of instruments is difficult to validate, we use another source of identification 
to see whether our estimates are robust to different plausible instruments. In particular, we use 
simplified reporting requirements as the excluded instrument in equations (2-3), and (2-4) (USDA 
2016b).37 The F-statistic of the IV (F=21.34) indicate that simple reporting requirements are 
predictive of SNAP participation. Table 2-C-4 shows the marginal effects of SNAP on the 
probability of employment for the discrete SNAP participation specification. Marginal effect 
estimates for the full-sample and the sample of women are qualitatively similar to those from our 
main model that uses the purchasing power of SNAP benefit as an instrument. However, we also 
find that SNAP participation increases labor supply in men only sample as well. This may be 
because the new instrument has sufficient power in the sample of men to identify an effect, which 
is not the case with our previous instrument. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect of SNAP 
participation on employment is twice as large for women as compared to men. 
2.6 Potential Mechanisms 
Our results suggest that participation in SNAP leads to higher rates of employment and more 
working hours. In order to investigate the mechanism behind these findings, we first consider the 
effect of changes in SNAP benefits on employment decisions by those enrolled in SNAP. 
Since SNAP’s general work requirements do not restrict the enrollment of unemployed 
individuals (just separation from employment for those receiving benefits), finding an effect of 
SNAP benefit amounts on those enrolled in SNAP would suggest that mechanisms other than work 
 
 
37 Simplified reporting requirements is the most powerful state-level instrument in the data sample. When we use 
state-level instrument, we use the MEPS data from 1996-2013. 
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requirements contribute to the positive effect of SNAP benefits on employment. To investigate 
this issue, we use two-stage least squares where the endogenous variables is the logarithm of SNAP 
benefits with the same regressors as specified in equations (2-5) and (2-6). We also estimate a 
conditional mixed process model to identify the marginal effect of SNAP benefits on working 
hours. In both cases, we estimate the model on the sample of individuals enrolled in SNAP. Tables 
2-5 (employment) and 2-6 (work hours) contain the marginal effects of SNAP benefits on 
employment outcomes for SNAP participants. We find that doubling SNAP benefits increases the 
likelihood of employment by 15.3 percentage points (35.6%) and also increases the likelihood of 
full-time work. When we stratify the sample by gender, we find that doubling SNAP benefit 
amounts increases the probability of employment for women by 13.7 percentage points (32.6%), 
but we lose power to identify effects on part-time versus full-time work. Overall, these results 
suggest that SNAP’s general work requirement is not the only reason why increases in SNAP 
benefit amounts lead to higher rates of employment and full time work. Therefore, we consider 
other possible mechanisms that may explain our results. 
One possibility is that SNAP improves recipients’ ability to pay for job-related expenses. 
Major categories of such expenses include transportation and child care (see Figure 2-B-1). The 
high cost of child care can be an impediment to taking a job among low income households with 
children. Since SNAP participation frees up income for nonfood expenditures, participant 
households may face fewer challenges in terms of arranging safe and reliable child care. The ability 
to pay childcare may induce them to work more by reducing their own time spent providing child 
care. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the percentage of income that poor families with 
employed mothers spend on child care is four times more than that of other working parents. 
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Families with incomes below 100 percent of the FPL spend 30.1 percent of their income on care 
and families with incomes from 100 to 200 percent of the FPL spend 17.9 percent of their income 
on care, compared to 6.9 percent of income for families with incomes at or above 200 percent of 
the FPL. While child care subsidy programs help defray these costs for some low-income families, 
only a small proportion of eligible families receive them. To help buffer the impact that out-of-
pocket child care expenses can have on family food budgets, Congress in 1980 created a separate 
SNAP deduction for dependent care expenses. This allows SNAP recipients to deduct dependent 
care expenses required for work from income when calculating SNAP benefits. The deduction 
allows for both licensed child care as well as informal or alternative types of care as long as another 
member of the food stamp household does not provide it. Similarly, household members caring 
for elderly or disabled adults who are financially dependent upon the household member may also 
be eligible for the dependent care deduction even if they live in the same household. While any 
household with out-of-pocket dependent care expenses is eligible for this deduction, the group 
most likely to claim it is single-parent households with children where the parent is employed. The 
deduction provides SNAP recipients with children an additional incentive to work. 
We use data from Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class (ECLS-K) to 
empirically examine whether children in SNAP households are more likely to receive care from 
non-parental sources. The ECLS-K is a nationally representative survey of children entering 
kindergarten in the 1998–1999 school year conducted by the National Center for Educational 
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education (Institute of Education Sciences 2009). The ECLS-
K collected information from children, their parents, teachers and their schools, using a variety of 
methods. Parents were surveyed by a trained interviewer over the phone, and teachers and school 
administrators completed paper and pencil surveys.  
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Data were collected during the fall and spring of kindergarten (1998–1999), fall and spring 
of first grade (1999–2000), the spring of third grade (2002), the spring of fifth grade (2004), and 
the spring of eighth grade (2007), but not all of those waves are useful for this analysis. We include 
the fall kindergarten, the spring 1st, 3rd, and 5th grades, because information on child care 
arrangements are recorded only for these four waves. The spring kindergarten wave does not 
include information on child care, so we use that wave only to extract certain time-invariant 
characteristics of children, such as their race and ethnicity. 
Parents in the ECLS-K are interviewed about their participation in SNAP, and the data also 
contain various measures of child care. We create binary measures of whether the child receives 
care from a child care center or from a non-parental arrangement, current relative, or non-relative. 
We then estimate a recursive bivariate probit model to determine whether SNAP households are 
more likely to utilize non-parental child care services. The first equation in the model predicts 
SNAP participation and the second equation predicts whether the child receives any non-parental 
care. The instrument we use to identify SNAP participation is a variable that indicates whether the 
SNAP recipient’s state of residence expands categorical eligibility rules, also known as broad-
based categorical eligibility (BBCE).38 Under BBCE, states can opt to set a gross income limit 
higher than the SNAP Federal limit and waive, or relax, the SNAP Federal asset test. The F-statistic 
of this instrument is 8.9. The set of control variables includes: child age, gender, race/ethnicity 
(White, Black, Hispanic, and Other), population density of residence (urban, suburban, and rural), 
number of household members under age 18, the age of parents (if they live in the household), the 
 
 
38 When we use ECLS-K data, we are not able to use the purchasing power of maximum allotment as an instrument 
for SNAP enrollment, since the ECLS-K data does not contain information on the county of residence. BBCE is the 
most powerful state-level instrument in the ECLS-K data sample. 
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log of total family income normalized by the square root of household size, and the years of 
education of the most educated parent. 
Results for this model are reported in Table 2-7. We do not find any statistically significant 
impact of SNAP participation on relative care or care from a child care center, but we do find that 
children in SNAP households are 3.9 percentage points more likely to receive care from informal 
arrangements. Informal care refers to minimally regulated care provided by a neighbor or extended 
family member looking after a child outside school hours. Importantly, this type of child care 
qualifies for the SNAP dependent care deduction.  
Another potential mechanism for our findings is that SNAP participants may be able to 
consume more or higher quality food, which increases their productivity. This could both increase 
their incentives to seek paid employment, and also increase the effectiveness of their job search. 
We are limited in our ability to investigate such a nutrition effect directly because the MEPS does 
not contain data on food intake. Instead, we estimate the impact of SNAP participation on self-
reported physical and mental health status, both of which are correlated with nutrition (Evans and 
Garthwaite 2014; Kreider et al. 2012; Miller and Morrissey 2017).39 Results from our IV model 
indicate that SNAP participation decreases the probability of reporting poor or fair health by 5.9 
percentage points (9.3%) and increases the probability of reporting very good or excellent health 
by 3.4 percentage points (11.0%; Table 2-8). These results are qualitatively similar to those in 
Gregory and Deb (2015), who use fewer years of MEPS data, and a different estimation strategy. 
Likewise, we find that SNAP participation is associated with improvements in self-assessed mental 
health. Prior research has shown that a better physical and mental health is associated with a higher 
 
 
39 In addition to the set of controls in the labor supply models, we control for health insurance coverage when we 
estimate the effects on self-reported health. 
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likelihood of employment (Dooley, Fielding and Levi 1996; Currie and Madrian 1999; Peng, 
Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas 2016). 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this article, we present evidence on the work incentive effects of SNAP participation and the 
level of SNAP benefits. Our finding that SNAP participation increases employment is contrary to 
earlier studies based on data collected before important welfare reforms. SNAP has undergone 
substantial changes over the past two decades. These changes affected both the number and 
characteristics of those enrolled in SNAP, as well as the work incentives that they face. Our results 
suggest that the combined effect of these incentives is to increase both employment and hours 
worked, particularly for single mothers. We also find that increases in SNAP benefit levels lead to 
higher employment among SNAP participants, which suggests that the positive effect of SNAP on 
employment is not purely due to SNAP’s general work requirement. We support this finding with 
evidence that SNAP households are more likely to use informal child care than non-participating 
SNAP-eligible households, suggesting that the ability to afford job-related expenses may 
contribute to higher rates of employment. This is consistent with the stronger effects of SNAP on 
the labor supply of single mothers than married adults. Furthermore, SNAP participation leads to 
higher self-reported health, which could increase productivity. 
Our study has some limitations that must be recognized. First, we use variation in the 
purchasing power of the maximum SNAP allotment (determined by federal program rules and 
regional food prices) for identification. Although we include controls for time-varying state and 
regional characteristics in our models as well as market area fixed effects, it is still possible that 
our results could be confounded by the selection of SNAP-eligible individuals into low-cost areas. 
We do note, however, that the large size of market regions may mitigate the effects of consumer 
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selection into specific locations. We are also reassured that our models fail to identify effects in a 
placebo sample of non-SNAP adults. Another limitation of our study is that we are not able to 
disentangle work incentives effect of work requirements from the effects of SNAP participation 
on disposable income or nutrition and health. However, we find evidence that work requirements 
are not the only mechanism for our findings. Finally, prior studies demonstrate that SNAP 
participation is often under-reported in household surveys. We conduct a sensitivity analysis which 
suggests that our qualitative findings are not the result of measurement error, but measurement 
error may still affect the magnitudes of our estimated marginal effects. 
Despite these limitations, we believe that our study has important implications for public 
policy. First, we provide the foundational analysis necessary to understand how low paid workers 
react to SNAP participation, and insight into how states can structure the design of policies to 
facilitate employment among SNAP recipients.  For example, our study suggests that states may 
wish to examine how SNAP allowances for dependent care are utilized. Although households have 
been able to deduct the full amount of their eligible dependent care costs from their gross income 
since 2008, few households take advantage of this deductions (CBPP 2017). Great use of the SNAP 
dependent care deduction could boost labor force participation and hours worked among low-paid 
workers. Second, these findings are relevant to recent policy debates on strengthening work 
requirements in the SNAP. If SNAP participation already increases labor force participation and 
hours worked, it is unclear whether stronger work requirements would have a meaningful impact 
on these outcomes.  
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Figure 2-1. Variation in SNAP Purchasing Power over Time 
Panel A. Variation in maximum allotment/TFP price using unadjusted food prices 
 
Panel B. Variation in maximum allotment/TFP price using regression adjusted food prices 
 
Notes: The above figure depicts quarterly-level mean of the ratio of maximum SNAP allotment to TFP price (with 
minimum and maximum). TFP prices are constructed from the Quarterly Food-at-home Price Database (QFAHPD) 
across market group areas from 1999 to 2010. While in Panel A, we use raw TFP prices, Panel B uses regression 
adjusted TFP prices as discussed in the identification section.  
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Table 2-2. First Stage of IV Model  
 (1)  (2)   
 SNAP participation  Log( SNAP benefit)    
Coefficient F-statistic  Coefficient  F-statistic  observations 
Panel 1: Full-sample      
SNAP purchasing 0.211*** 25.20  1.376*** 27.77  62,065 
power (0.042)   (0.261)    
        
Panel 2: Women only       
SNAP purchasing 0.242*** 37.70  1.630*** 46.65  36,180 
power (0.039)   (0.239)    
        
Panel 3: Men only       
SNAP purchasing 0.141** 6.81  0.901*** 7.02  25,885 
power (0.054)   (0.340)    
        
Notes: Both specifications include time-varying household demographic controls, state and market characteristics, 
market and year fixed effects. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 300 iterations are corrected for 
clustering at the market group level. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-3. Marginal Effects of SNAP on Employment among SNAP-Eligible Adults 
 (1)  (2) Mean of dep. var.   
Non-IV  IV 
Panel 1: Full-sample     
SNAP participation  -0.106***  0.038*** 0.589 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.017***  0.027*** 0.589 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  
Panel 2: Women only     
SNAP participation  -0.116***  0.055*** 0.565 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.018***  0.033*** 0.565 
 (0.001)  (0.005)  
Panel 3: Men only     
SNAP participation  -0.107***  -0.003 0.618 
 (0.013)  (0.012)  
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.017***  0.010 0.618 
 (0.002)  (0.009)  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for the complex design of the MEPS for the non-IV model. For IV 
model, bootstrap standard errors based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market group level. Both 
specifications include time-varying household demographic controls, state and market characteristics, market and year 
fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-5. Marginal Effect of SNAP Benefits on Employment among Adult SNAP Participants  
Non-IV IV Mean  Observations 
Panel 1: Full-sample     
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.002 0.153*** 0.43 22,859  
(0.006) (0.044)   
Panel 2: Women only     
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.006 0.137*** 0.42 14,839  
(0.007) (0.053)   
Panel 3 :Men only     
Log (SNAP benefit) 0.001 0.049 0.45 8,020  
(0.008) (0.178)   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for the complex design of the MEPS for the non-IV models. For 
IV models, bootstrap standard errors based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market group level. 
Both regression models include time-varying household demographic controls, state and market characteristics, 
market and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-6. Marginal Effect of SNAP Benefits on Work Hours among Employed SNAP Adults 
 
hour<30 (hour<40 & 
hour>=30) 
hour>=40 Observations 
Panel 1: Full-sample     
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.147* -0.031** 0.178** 11,448 
 (0.081) (0.012) (0.093)  
Panel 2: Women only     
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.162 -0.015 0.177 6,877 
 (0.115) (0.011) (0.126)  
Panel 3: Men only     
Log (SNAP benefit) -0.080 -0.036 0.117 4,571 
 (0.191) (0.069) (0.261)  
 Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market 
group level. The regression model includes time-varying household demographic controls, state and market 
characteristics, market and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-7. Marginal Effects of SNAP Participation on the Use of Non-Parental Child Care  
Non-parental care Formal care Informal care Relatives 
Panel A: non-IV -0.041* -0.005 0.012 -0.042*  
(0.023) (0.015) (0.011) (0.023)      
Panel B: IV -0.082 -0.043 0.039* -0.016  
(0.122) (0.042) (0.020) (0.073)      
Observations   6450 6450 6450 6450 
Notes: Standard errors for IV models are corrected for clustering at the state level. Sample sizes are rounded to the 
nearest 50 in order to comply with Department of Education non-disclosure requirements for ECLS-K, 1998. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-8. Marginal Effects of SNAP Participation on Self-Reported Health  
 Physical health  Mental health 
 Poor Fair/Good Excellent  Poor Fair/Good Excellent 
SNAP -0.059*** 0.001 0.034***  -0.035*** -0.023*** 0.044*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
        
Log(SNAP benefit) -0.031*** 0.013** 0.032***  -0.016*** -0.006 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
Notes: bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market 
group level. Regression models include time-varying household demographic controls, state and market 
characteristics, market and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Appendix A. Measurement Error Adjusted SNAP Measure 
In this section, we explore the possibility that our results are confounded by measurement error in 
self-reported SNAP participation. To do this we use data on state-level rates of SNAP participation 
from SNAP Data System to construct an error-adjusted measure of SNAP participation. 
First, we estimate a state-level regression of the state SNAP participation rate on state-level 
measures of demographic composition and socio-economic status, the unemployment rate, and the 
poverty rate from the U.S. Census Bureau, as well as state-level SNAP policies determining 
eligibility criteria, recertification and reporting requirements, benefit issuance methods, 
availability of online applications, use of biometric technology (such as fingerprinting), and 
coordination with other low-income assistance programs from the SNAP Policy Database. 40  
We subsequently use this model to predict SNAP participation for individuals in the MEPS 
who are eligible for SNAP, but do not report participating in the program. In order to make this 
prediction, we use the individual’s demographic information, but the state-level information from 
the individual’s state of residence for the other state-level measures. We reclassify eligible 
individuals who did not report participating in SNAP in the MEPS with the highest predicted 
participation levels as SNAP participants. We do this until the rate of SNAP participation in the 
MEPS equals the national rate of SNAP participation in each year.41  
  
 
 
40 State-level measures of demographic composition and socioeconomic status include age categories (0-5, 6-13, 14-
17, 18-24, 25-44, 45-64, 65 and older), educational attainment (college degree or higher, high school diploma, below 
high school), race and ethnicity (white, black, Hispanic, and other races), and per capita income. 
41 Time-series data on individual level rate of SNAP participation available at:  
https://www.fns.usda.gov/pd/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap 
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Appendix B. Additional Figures 
Figure 2-B-1. Fraction of Monthly Household Expenditures, By Expenditure Category 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations from the FoodAPS. Sample includes SNAP recipients. 
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Appendix C. Additional Tables 
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Table 2-C-2. Marginal Effect of SNAP on Employment Outcomes after Adjustment for 
Misclassification of SNAP Participation 
 Employment  Hours   
  
hour<30 (hour<40 & 
hour>=30) 
hour>=40 
Panel 1: Full sample     
SNAP 0.021 -0.217*** -0.060*** 0.276*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.005) (0.033) 
Panel 2: Women only     
SNAP 0.038** -0.262*** -0.049*** 0.312*** 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.003) (0.029) 
Panel 3: Men only     
SNAP -0.023 -0.095** -0.040** 0.135** 
 (0.016) (0.048) (0.018) (0.066) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market 
group level. Both regression model includes time-varying household demographic controls, state and market 
characteristics, market and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-C-3. Marginal Effect of Variation in SNAP Purchasing Power on Employment among 
SNAP Eligible Adults, by Participation Status   
Maximum SNAP 
allotment/TFP 
Panel 1: SNAP  
Full-sample 0.098**  
(0.036) 
Women only 0.112***  
(0.039) 
Men only 0.020  
(0.066) 
Panel 2: Non-SNAP   
Full-sample 0.049 
 (0.032) 
Women only 0.076 
 (0.059) 
Men only -0.022 
 (0.030) 
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses based on 300 iterations are corrected for clustering at the market 
group level. The regression model includes time-varying household demographic controls, state and market 
characteristics, market and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 2-C-4. Marginal Effect of SNAP Participation on Employment when Simplified Reporting 
is Used as the Instrument   
IV F-statistic Observations 
Panel 1: Full-sample    
SNAP participation 0.034*** 21.34 88,214  
(0.004)   
Panel 2: Women only    
SNAP participation 0.040*** 19.3 51,614  
(0.003)   
Panel 3: Men only    
SNAP participation 0.019** 25.70 36,600  
(0.008)   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the state level. The regression model includes 
time-varying household demographic controls, state characteristics, state and year fixed effects. 
Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
How Was Medical Care Utilization Affected by the 
Medicaid Primary Care Fee Bump? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The fraction of Medicaid enrollees has almost tripled since the 1970s, from approximately 8.4 
percent in 1972 to 23.6 percent in 2017 (Gruber 2003; Sommers and Grabowski 2017). However, 
providing coverage is not equivalent to providing access to medical care. Coverage expansions 
will only translate into better access to health care if the supply of providers is adequate and 
providers are willing to treat publicly insured patients. Historically, Medicaid offered lower 
reimbursement rates to providers for the same services relative to other payers (Zuckerman and 
Goin 2012; Zuckerman, Skopec and Epstein 2017; Zuckerman, Skopec and Mccormack 2014; 
Berman et al. 2002). For example, in 2012, the average state-level ratio of Medicaid-to-Medicare 
physician fees was 0.59 for primary care providers. This disparity in reimbursement discourages 
providers from participating in Medicaid, and many primary care physicians do not accept 
Medicaid patients (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission 2011).  
This preference for privately insured patients concerns policymakers for two reasons. First, 
limited access to physicians leads to less utilization of health care by Medicaid beneficiaries 
(Dafny and Gruber 2005). Second, a shortage of participating physicians could reduce the 
efficiency of health care use. In particular, if Medicaid recipients cannot gain access to physician 
offices, they will seek care in the emergency room (ER). Treating non-urgent and primary care 
preventable illnesses in the ER is more expensive than treating these illnesses in the physician’s 
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office (Baker and Baker 1994; Bamezai, Melnick and Nawathe 2005; Weinick, Burns and 
Mehrotra 2010). 
Understanding how health care utilization responds to changes in Medicaid payments is 
critical for evaluating the costs, benefits, and incidence of payment changes. We aid in this 
understanding by exploring the impact of large increases in Medicaid provider reimbursement 
rates for primary care services. The federally mandated increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates 
—known as “Medicaid fee bump”—is the main source of variation in Medicaid reimbursement 
rates used in the study. This change was part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and required all 
states to increase their Medicaid payment rates for primary care visits to the level of Medicare 
rates for a two-year period starting from January 2013. However, the implementation did not occur 
in most states until after May 2013.  The fee bump ended on December 31st, 2014, although some 
states continued to pay the enhanced rates using state revenues (Tollen 2015).  
Using variation in the generosity of Medicaid reimbursement, we investigate the effect of 
changes in Medicaid payments on the type, place, and composition of care received by Medicaid 
patients. We employ two complementary identification strategies to address the potential 
endogeneity of states’ provider payment policies.42 Our first analysis includes a regression 
discontinuity (RD) design that uses the Medicaid fee bump to identify the break in the utilization 
trend of medical services. Our second strategy follows the work of Alexander and Schnell (2017) 
and uses a fixed-effects (FE) model that exploits within-state variation in Medicaid payments to 
primary care physicians for identification. In the latter, like Alexander and Schnell (2017), we 
 
 
42 While the variation driven by the Medicaid fee bump was exogenous to states, the size of fee bump in each state 
reflects its pre-2013 policy in the payments to physicians. For example, states may have increased Medicaid 
reimbursement rates in response to serious access problems prior to the fee bump. If so, the change in Medicaid 
reimbursement rates might be correlated with unobserved factors that influence healthcare outcomes.  
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incorporate hand-collected state-level data on fee schedules for five primary care services in order 
to trace out variation in state-level Medicaid payment policies before and during the Medicaid fee 
bump. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first comprehensive study of the effects of the Medicaid fee bump on the use of care by 
Medicaid patients at the both extensive and intensive margins. The only outcome variable 
measuring utilization in the literature (Alexander and Schnell 2017) is constructed from a survey 
question that asks whether the respondent had an office visit in past two weeks, which only allows 
analysis at the extensive margin of office visit use. Second, we consider the mechanisms through 
which higher payments to providers improve access to care. We find that physicians likely increase 
the supply of services through the use of substitutes such as nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants. No past study provides information on how changes in Medicaid payments affect 
provider mix. This extension sheds light on previous inconsistencies identified in the literature. In 
particular, several studies find that enhanced provider reimbursement rates improve access to care 
and health outcomes (Alexander and Schnell 2017; Polsky et al. 2015; Candon et al. 2018), but 
two studies find limited effects of the fee bump on physician participation in Medicaid (Decker 
2018; Mulcahy, Gracner and Finegold 2018). Our results suggest that increasing the number of 
physicians participating in Medicaid is not necessary to enhance access to care among Medicaid 
patients. Finally, this study is the first to provide evidence that the fee bump led to more appropriate 
use of hospital emergency rooms and improved access to prescription drugs. 
Twenty eight states and the District of Columbia that expanded their Medicaid programs by 
the end of our study period (January, 2015) substantially increased the number of Medicaid 
beneficiaries. Since the expansion could also affect the supply of primary care providers, we 
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conduct several tests to confirm that our results represent the causal effect of the payment policy 
changes as opposed to the ACA Medicaid expansions. First, we estimate our models using the time 
period before the ACA Medicaid expansions and find similar results. This is also true when we 
estimate our models using the sample of children, who are relatively unaffected by the ACA 
expansions. Finally, we conduct a falsification test using non-primary care physicians, who should 
not be affected by the Medicaid fee bump. 
3.2 Background  
3.2.1 Medicaid Primary Care Fee Bump  
The Medicaid program is jointly financed by the federal government and the states and is 
administered by state agencies. Although states must follow several guidelines in order to receive 
federal matching funds, they have always had substantial discretion in determining Medicaid 
reimbursement policy, and many state Medicaid programs reimburse providers at a lower rate for 
the same services relative to other payers. 
The ACA required states to raise Medicaid payment rates for primary care services to equal 
Medicare rates in 2013 and 2014. The intensity of this increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates 
was determined by states’ pre-2013 payment policy. In particular, states with relatively low 
Medicaid reimbursement rates before the mandated fee increase experienced a comparatively large 
boost by the fee bump (Figure 3-B-1). The federal government financed the full amount of the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate increase over this period.43 . However, the federal government did 
not re-authorize the fee bump beyond December 31st, 2014. In January 2015, 16 states and District 
 
 
43 The amount provided was equal to the difference between a state’s Medicaid fees in effect in 2009 and Medicare 
fees in 2013 and 2014. 
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of Columbia used their own funds to continue to finance the enhanced reimbursement rates and 34 
states reduced payment rates. 
The ACA specified 146 health care services eligible for the fee bump that include primary 
care office visits, outpatient visits, and vaccine administration codes that are used by physicians in 
family medicine, general internal medicine, and pediatrics. The enhanced Medicaid rates were also 
available for services delivered by nurse practitioners and physician assistants under the personal 
supervision of a qualified physician.  
3.2.2 Literature Review 
A theoretical framework for analyzing physician responses to changes in Medicaid reimbursement 
rates is a model by Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell (1978), which allocates provider supply between 
private and public patients. This model predicts that higher Medicaid rates relative to private 
market fees will increase the number of visits supplied to Medicaid patients. In addition, the 
response of physicians to a Medicaid fee boost will depend on the shape of their marginal cost 
curves, which may depend on the availability of ancillary personnel such as nurses and physician 
assistants. The use of substitutes will increase the productivity of the practice and result in a more 
elastic supply curve (see the appendix section A). 
Several studies leveraging pre-fee bump data empirically examine the relationship between 
Medicaid reimbursement and physician participation in the program and find that higher Medicaid 
fees are associated with a higher probability of seeing any Medicaid patients (Sloan, Mitchell, and 
Cromwell 1978; Decker 2007).  
Studies that investigate whether this supply response leads to better access to treatment 
suggests that higher payment rates are indeed associated with improved access (Shen and 
Zuckerman 2005; Decker 2007, 2009, 2011; Buchmueller, Orzol and Shore-Sheppard 2015; Baker 
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and Royalty 2000; Gruber, Adams, and Newhouse 1997; Cohen and Cunningham 1995; Chen 
2014; Gray 2001, Sonchak 2015). A much smaller literature investigates the impact of Medicaid 
payments on the utilization of medical services. Decker (2009) finds that reductions in Medicaid 
physician fees are associated with fewer physician visits for Medicaid enrollees, and a shift from 
Medicaid patient encounters in physicians’ offices toward hospital outpatient and emergency 
departments. However, Atherly and Mortensen (2014) find that increases in the Medicaid primary 
care fee rate have no effect on the probability of receiving a test for cancer, hypertension, or high 
cholesterol. Callison and Nguyen (2018) find that an increase in Medicaid payments for primary 
care services results in an increase in physician visits, emergency department utilization, and 
prescription fills.  
Several studies on the effects of the Medicaid fee bump suggest that the ACA fee bump was 
associated with improvements in access to care (Polsky et al. 2015; Alexander and Schnell 2017;  
Candon et al. 2018). Closest to our study, Alexander and Schnell (2017) find evidence that the fee 
bump was associated with improvements in access to care among beneficiaries. Their results 
suggest that a $10 increase in Medicaid payments increases the probability that Medicaid patients 
had an office visit in the past two weeks by 1.5 percent. On the contrary, other studies have 
documented more limited effects of the payment increase. Decker (2018) and Mulcahy, Gracner, 
and Finegold (2018) find no increase in primary care physicians’ acceptance of new Medicaid 
patients following the Medicaid fee bump. Similarly, Maclean et al. (2018) find no significant 
spillover effects on behavioral healthcare outcomes, substance use disorders, and tobacco product 
use.  
We extend the work of Alexander and Schnell (2017) as the first study of the effect of the 
Medicaid fee bump at both the intensive and extensive margins of medical care use. In addition, 
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detailed data on medical visits and insurance coverage allows to use the RD design and investigate 
the robustness of our findings from the FE model. We also provide the first evidence of which 
types of providers are likely to absorb Medicaid patients when reimbursement rates increase, and 
how the fee bump affect the composition of other medical services, such as ER care or prescription 
drugs.  
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
Our primary data source is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS is a 
comprehensive, nationally representative survey of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized 
population. It contains detailed information for each individual in the household on demographic 
characteristics, socioeconomic status, health status, and health insurance coverage. Respondents 
are interviewed about their medical care use and expenditures over the course of two years through 
five survey rounds. For each visit to an office-based medical care provider, information is collected 
on the type of provider (e.g., physician, nurse practitioner, physician assistant), and if the provider 
was a physician, the respondent is asked about the physician’s specialty. Provider designations are 
mutually exclusive such that any medical visits where the respondent saw a physician and another 
provider type are classified as physician visits. In addition, information from the household is 
supplemented by expenditure data collected directly from participants’ medical service providers 
and pharmacies through a Medical Provider Component. We subset the sample to Medicaid 
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beneficiaries and exclude those age 65 and older, and adults under-65 who are Medicare 
beneficiaries.44,45  
3.3.2 Medicaid Reimbursement Rates 
For each year, we assembled annual state-level primary care Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
Following the idea of Alexander and Schnell (2017), we collected the 5-reimbursement rates 
associated with new patient evaluation and management (E&M) services (CPT 99201-99205).46 
To assemble the database, first, we collected the fee for service Medicaid reimbursement rates 
from the websites of states’ Medicaid agencies. In cases where historical fee schedules were not 
available, we contacted Medicaid agencies directly.  Figure 3-1 presents the changes in fees for 
these five codes across the U.S. and over time. Prior to 2013 the average fee was relatively low, 
however in 2013 the fee boost is evident. For example, the average Medicaid payment for a 30-
minute new patient E&M visit increased from $63.46 in 2012 to $110.99 in 2013. Similarly, the 
sharp decline in the fee bump in 2015 is evident as the federal mandate was not continued by the 
majority of states. 
As the percentage increases in fees across all eligible codes were quite similar, our main 
results use the reimbursement rate of 30-minute new patient office visit only. This is because there 
is a strong correlation between Medicaid payments for different codes within states over time. In 
addition, the percentage change in 30-minute new patient E&M visits is 75%, which is similar in 
 
 
44 It is not possible in the MEPS to distinguish individuals who are enrolled in Medicaid and those who are in separate 
stand-alone CHIP programs. 
45 For the dual-eligible population, the physician fee received for treating patients is the Medicare-allowed charge. 
Medicaid covers only the deductibles and cost sharing for this amount. 
46 Many existing studies rely on the Medicaid-Medicare fee index (see, for example, Decker 2007, 2009; Zuckerman 
and Goin 2012; Callison and Nguyen 2018; Maclean et al. 2018). We do not use the Medicaid-Medicare fee index in 
our study for two reasons. First, the data are only available on 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2012. Second, using a 
Medicaid-Medicare ratio may measure changes driven by fluctuations in Medicare prices instead of Medicaid prices. 
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magnitude to the estimated average Medicaid rate increase.47,48 We exclude Tennessee from our 
FE analysis as this state did not a have fee-for-service Medicaid program during our study period. 
Although there were some delays in fee bump payments to physicians in early 2013, we 
follow Alexander and Schnell (2017) and do not incorporate these delays into our Medicaid 
payment variable. This decision is based on the assumption that physicians expected to receive the 
enhanced payments in the future from Medicaid. Consistent with this assumption, our results are 
robust to dropping the time period in which the enhanced rates were paid retrospectively. Since 
the fee bump also applied to managed care organizations, we impute Medicaid managed care 
payments before and after the fee bump, using a similar approach to Alexander and Schnell (2017).  
3.3.3 Control Variables 
Control variables in each model include age (dichotomous indicators for age 6–17, 18–24, 25–34, 
35–44, 45–54 , 55–64 with age 0–5 as the omitted category), gender, marital status, race and 
ethnicity (Hispanic, black, and other race with white as the omitted category), urban residence, 
education (high school diploma, some college, college degree, with less than a high school degree 
omitted), number of children in the household (under age 5, 5–18), the log of total family income 
normalized by the square root of household size, and whether the individual has a paid sick leave 
benefit. In order to control for health status, we use self-reported mental and physical health 
(poor/fair health in all rounds, poor/fair health in some rounds, excellent health in some rounds, 
excellent health in all rounds, good/very good health in all rounds, and self-reported health is 
missing, with good/very good health in some rounds serving as the omitted category for both 
 
 
47 The Urban Institute estimates that the Medicaid fee bump increased Medicaid rates by 73% (Zuckerman and Goin 
2012). 
48 We test the sensitivity of our estimates to different definitions of Medicaid reimbursement rates and come to similar 
conclusions. In particular, we also estimate our models using the rates associated with other CPT codes as well as the 
average of the five reimbursement rates. 
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mental and physical health), and a measure of disability status. The latter is a binary variable that 
indicates whether the person had an IADL (Instrumental Activities of Daily Living) or ADL 
(Activities of Daily Living), functional, activity, or sensory limitation in any interview round. 
To account for area-level attributes, we control for several variables at either the county or 
state level that could be correlated with both healthcare outcomes and Medicaid fees. These include 
the county-level per capita supply of general practitioner, nurse practitioners, pediatricians, 
hospital beds, as well as median household income, unemployment rate, percentage of bachelor’s 
degree for persons 25 years of age and older, state-level managed care penetration rate, and 
whether area is underserved for primary care services (Mathematica Policy Research 2017; HRSA 
2017a,b). We also control for state-level data on community health center delivery sites (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2017). Finally, we include an indicator for the ACA Medicaid expansion 
following Maclean, Pesko and Hill (2017). The inclusion of a Medicaid expansion control is 
particularly important as this policy may have altered the composition of enrollees.  
Table 3-1 reports summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis by patient 
insurance type. These statistics show clear evidence that Medicaid beneficiaries have lower 
incomes, less education, poorer health status, and relatively poor access to health care resources 
compared to the privately insured respondents. 
3.3.4 Outcome Variables 
Our main outcomes are derived from the MEPS medical event files. We classify medical visits 
into whether the individual had any visits to a primary care physician, physician specialist, or non-
physician provider. Primary care physicians are general practitioners, family practitioners, 
internists, and pediatricians. Physicians in any other specialty are considered specialists. Non-
physician providers are separated into midlevel primary care providers, which for our study are 
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comprised of nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants, and all other providers 
(chiropractors, or physical and occupational therapists). For each of these types of visits, we study 
the number of visits, and expenditures.  
Figure 3-B-2 shows the utilization rates for office-based visits with these four provider types 
by the type of insurance coverage. Medicaid beneficiaries have a slightly higher likelihood of 
visiting a primary care provider in the past year compared to the privately insured. Likewise, 
among those with some utilization, Medicaid respondents report having 0.5 more primary care 
physician visits in the last year compared to individuals with private insurance.  
3.4 Econometric Models 
3.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design 
Our first estimation approach exploits unexpected, exogenous variation in the generosity of 
Medicaid reimbursement rates for primary care providers driven by the Medicaid fee bump. In 
essence, this approach involves comparing the healthcare outcomes of Medicaid beneficiaries just 
prior to January 1, 2013 (immediately before the Medicaid fee bump was implemented) with 
healthcare outcomes just after January 1, 2013 (immediately after the Medicaid fee bump was 
enacted). This strategy is motivated by the idea that characteristics related to outcomes of interest 
vary smoothly across this treatment threshold; therefore, any discontinuity in medical care 
utilization can be reasonably attributed to the sharp change in Medicaid reimbursement rates.  
Our RD design takes the form of an interrupted time-series model. In particular, we estimate 
the following model:  
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(Δ) + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (3-1) 
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where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a healthcare outcome for individual 𝑖𝑖 living in state 𝑠𝑠 in month 𝑡𝑡49, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
socio-demographic and health status variables, 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 is a dummy that takes the value one for 
fee bump months, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is a vector of month fixed effects in a year, and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is a vector of state fixed 
effects. 𝑓𝑓(Δ) is a smooth function of time in months from the cutoff, which represents the trend in 
Medicaid payments. We use a linear function of time, fully interacted with the post dummies as a 
baseline specification. As a robustness check, we add quadratic terms. Because the fee schedule 
changed again in many states in January 2015, we do not use any observations after December 
2014, and, for symmetry, we do not use any data from before January 2011. Results from narrower 
bandwidths yield nearly identical results, and are discussed in the results section. The Standard 
errors are clustered on the months from the cutoff (Carr and Packham 2019). 
When the outcome variable is the number of visits, or medical spending, we use a two-part 
model (Jones 2000). To account for a mass point in the utilization distribution at zero, the first part 
estimates the probability of having any medical visits (the extensive margin). The second part 
estimates the number of visits or amount of medical expenditures among medical care users (the 
intensive margin). The first part of the two part model is specified as:  
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(Δ) + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾1 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖, (3-2) 
Likewise, the second part of the two part model is the log of medical visits or expenditures for the 
sample of individuals with medical care use, specified as: 
𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓(Δ) + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾2 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (3-3) 
 
 
49 We use information on the date of each medical visit to construct monthly-level data on medical care utilization. 
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Equations (3-2) and (3-3) can be combined to derive the unconditional mean of medical visits or 
expenditures as follows:50 E[𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝛽𝛽 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)] = 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) × E[log (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1]. (3-4) 
The unconditional marginal effect of interest is derived as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1| 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 = 1) × E[log (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 = 1] − 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1| 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 = 0) × E[log (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡2013 = 0]. (3-5) 
The standard error of overall marginal effect is calculated using 300 bootstrap iterations. 
3.4.2 Fixed-Effects Specification 
Our second specification is a reduced-form FE model of the effect of Medicaid payment rates for 
primary care providers on healthcare outcomes. In this case, the estimates are identified by within-
state variation in Medicaid payment rates over time that deviates from a linear trend. In particular, 
we estimate the following model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜃𝜃 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿0𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , (3-6) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 12-month average Medicaid fee (in units of $10) for primary care services in 
state 𝑠𝑠 in year 𝑡𝑡, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of area-level controls, 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is a vector of year fixed effects, 𝛿𝛿0𝑖𝑖 is a 
vector of state fixed effects, and 𝛿𝛿1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of state-specific linear time trends. Standard errors 
are clustered by the state to account for serial correlation of the errors within states over time 
(Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). In this equation, our coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽 represents 
the effect of a $10 fee increase on outcome variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.  
 
 
50 To avoid the re-transformation problem, we use the log form of the dependent variable, and interpret the marginal 
effects as percentage changes. 
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Similar to our RD design, when the outcome variable is the number of visits, or medical 
spending, we use a two-part model. In this case, the unconditional marginal effect of interest is 
derived as follows: 
𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸2 = 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) × 𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛽𝛽1 × E[log (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)|𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1]. (3-7) 
Note that although the main source of identifying variation is the Medicaid fee bump in both 
the RD and FE specifications, the identifying assumptions of the two models are different. The 
RD estimates in equation (3-1) represent the discrete change in medical care utilization that 
occurred when the Medicaid fee bump went into effect. These estimates are unbiased if unobserved 
determinants of the outcome variable were continuous throughout the time of the fee increase. In 
contrast, the effect of the fee increases in the FE model in equation (3-6) is identified using 
continuous variation in Medicaid fees over time within each state under the assumption that the 
unobserved determinants of the outcomes were time-invariant over the sample period. 
The main advantage of the RD model is that it relies on the plausibly exogenous timing of 
the Medicaid fee bump policy change. Since the federal government did not release final guidance 
on this policy until two months prior to the effective date, concerns over anticipatory behavior by 
providers around the threshold are minimal. The primary disadvantage of RD identification is that 
the treatment effect of the policy is averaged over states that experienced large changes in payment 
levels and those that experience small or even no change in payment levels. This averaging serves 
to attenuate the estimated effect of the policy change. In contrast, the FE model makes use of the 
level of variation in Medicaid fees in each state resulting from the fee bump, which results in 
greater statistical precision. A disadvantage of the FE model, however, is that the magnitude of the 
fee changes may be endogenous because the starting level of Medicaid provider fees in each state 
was the result of a state-level decision. This will occur if the unobserved factors correlated with 
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both these decisions and medical care utilization vary nonlinearly over time. Furthermore, fee 
changes for Medicaid managed care plans are imputed, which introduces some measurement error 
into the magnitude of the fee changes. The advantages and disadvantages of each identification 
strategy must be kept in mind when interpreting the estimation results. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Regression Discontinuity Results 
We first examine the effect of the Medicaid fee bump on monthly-level utilization of office-based 
primary care physician visits using the RD design. Figure 3-2 presents graphical evidence that the 
fee bump affected visits to different provider types. Each figure plots the monthly mean of the log 
of visits (after differencing out state and month fixed effects).51 The months to the left of the 
vertical line are before the policy change, and the months to the right of the vertical line are after 
the policy change when enhanced rates were in effect. Visits to primary care physicians declined 
prior to 2013 and exhibited a modest jump after the Medicaid fee bump. Visits to mid-level primary 
care providers experienced a much steeper decline prior to 2013 but surged and leveled off 
following the policy change. In contrast, the trend in visits to physician specialists and other non-
physician providers who were not affected by the Medicaid fee bump is essentially flat over the 
sample period. 
Table 3-2 contains RD estimates of the Medicaid fee bump on medical care utilization based 
on regression models described in Equations (3-2) and (3-3). We measure utilization in three ways. 
First, we analyze the extensive margin of utilization, using an indicator variable equal to one if the 
individual visits any provider in a month and zero otherwise. Second, we analyze the log of number 
 
 
51 These fixed-effect account for time-series seasonality in visits that are not due to the Medicaid fee bump.  
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of visits conditional on use. Third, we present overall marginal effects from combing the first part 
and the second part of the model as indicated in Equation (3-5). Our main specification uses a 24-
month bandwidth on either side of the Medicaid payment policy change.  
Increased physician reimbursement under Medicaid increases the number of visits to 
primary care physicians by 1.3 percent at the intensive margin. The number of visits to mid-level 
primary care providers increases substantially, by 15.8 percent, also at the intensive margin. As 
shown in Column (3), on average there is no statistically significant effect of the Medicaid fee 
bump on the number of primary care physician visits at the extensive margin.  
Columns (7) – (10) of Table 3-2 contain the estimates of the effect of the fee bump on 
medical expenditure from all sources, while columns (11) – (14) correspond to models where the 
outcome variable was expenditure per visit. We find that the Medicaid fee bump increased total 
Medicaid spending on visits to primary care physicians by 16.7 percent and expenditure per visit 
by 16.5 percent at the intensive margin. In the case of mid-level providers, the fee bump increased 
total spending by 44.6 percent and expenditure per visit by 25.4 percent, also at the intensive 
margin. While the increased spending on visits to primary care physicians was mainly driven by 
the increase in expenditure per visit, higher spending on visits to mid-level providers was due to 
both an increase in visits and higher expenditure per visit. 
Next, we investigate whether the Medicaid fee bump had a greater influence on access to 
care among Medicaid enrollees who live in areas designated as primary care Health Professional 
Shortage Areas (HPSAs) (HRSA 2017b).52 To conduct this analysis, we interact our post-policy 
indicator in the RD design with a dummy variable indicating that county 𝑐𝑐 in year 𝑡𝑡 is underserved 
 
 
52 Primary care HPSAs are defined by the Department of Health and Human Services as geographic areas where the 
ratio of full-time primary care physician to population is less than one primary care physician per 2,000 individuals. 
For details of shortage designation criteria, see https://bhw.hrsa.gov/shortage-designation/hpsas. 
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for primary care services.53 The interaction term in the top section of column (4) indicates that 
individuals in counties that are underserved by primary care physicians experienced a statistically 
significant increase of 1.5 percentage points in the probability of visiting a primary care physician 
at least once in a month. The only significant change in the number of visits to other non-physician 
providers is at the extensive margin in shortage areas. However, we find that the increase in visits 
to mid-level providers at the intensive margin was smaller in HPSAs. 
We next examine whether Medicaid payment increases has any spillovers to individuals with 
private insurance and incomes above 400% of federal poverty line (FPL). These results suggest 
that there are no significant effects of the Medicaid fee bump on visits by privately insured patients. 
These findings are consistent with those reported by Alexander and Schnell (2017) and suggest 
that physicians were able to increase care to the new patients without reducing the amount of care 
they provided to other patients (Table 3-B-1). 
We explore the robustness of several aspects of our RD results. To test bandwidth sensitivity, 
we replicate the models under a range of bandwidths. We test bandwidths from 12 months on 
either side (i.e. prior to the ACA Medicaid expansions in 2014) to the full 24 months used in the 
main specification in increments of one month at a time. Figure 3-3 presents the coefficients and 
standard errors from models using each of these alternative bandwidths. For both visits to primary 
care physician and visits to mid-level providers, the estimated coefficient on the policy change is 
stable across the different bandwidths and is nearly always statistically significant at the 5% level. 
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications for the running variable, 
 
 
53 A similar approach has been used in other contexts in the literature (e.g., see Alexander and Schnell 2019). 
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including linear and quadratic, and found the results to be nearly identical across specifications 
(Table 3-B-2).54  
As discussed above, some states experienced implementation delays in their payment of 
enhanced Medicaid rates and increased payments were made retroactively. In order to test the 
sensitivity of our RD estimates to these delayed payments, we estimated a donut-hole RD in which 
we excluded between one six months on either side of the cutoff. As shown in Figure 3-B-3, the 
estimates are not statistically different across the alternative models.  
We investigate whether covariates varied significantly at the time of the policy change in 
order to validate the basic assumption of the RD specification. If the characteristics of the sample 
before and after the cut-off were different, then our RD estimates may reflect the change in the 
composition of the sample, not the effect of the Medicaid fee bump policy itself. All but one 
variable show no differential change at around the January 2013 policy implementation date (Table 
3-B-3).55  
We performed two falsification tests on our RD model. In the first test, we estimate the RD 
model on visits to non-primary care physicians (i.e. physician specialists) who should not be 
affected by the payment change. This is because the fee bump only increased rates for primary 
care services. Table 3-B-4 displays marginal effects on the number of visits to and expenditure on 
specialists and we find no changes associated with the Medicaid fee bump. The second falsification 
test, also reported in Table 3-B-4, involves the analysis of visits to other non-physician providers, 
who likewise were not affected by the fee bump. In this case, we do find that visits in HPSA 
shortage areas were higher, but all of the other estimates are small and imprecise. Overall, these 
 
 
54 We find similar results for polynomials of order 3. These results are available upon request. 
55 Since we do not have monthly demographic data, we are not able to examine whether the covariates vary smoothly 
at the cutoff in the regression framework of equation (1).  
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falsification tests suggest that the effects of the fee bump on primary care visits resulted from the 
Medicaid payment policy, and not from contemporaneous changes in the health care system.  
Finally, we check whether the running variable was being manipulated across the cutoff. 
Our RD design will over-estimate the treatment effect if providers were systematically re-
scheduling visits until after the fee bump took effect. We present a histogram of visits to primary 
care providers to check whether abnormal heaps occur to the left- or right-hand side of the cutoff. 
As can be seen in Figure 3-B-4 this does not appear to be the case. 
3.5.2 Fixed-Effects Results 
We now present estimates from the FE models, which make use of the magnitude of the change in 
Medicaid fees in each state that resulted from the fee bump.  
Table 3-3 presents results from the FE model we use to investigate how the outcomes vary 
with the magnitude of the fee change. We find that a $10 increase in Medicaid payments is 
associated with a 2.9 percent increase in the total number of visits to primary care physicians. On 
the extensive margin, a $10 increase in payments is associated with an increase in the fraction of 
individuals having at least one office-based primary care physician visit of 1.8 percentage points 
(3 %), while on the intensive margin the number of visits increases by 1.5 percent. Although we 
don’t find any difference between HPSAs and non-HPSAs in total primary care physician visits, 
there is an increase of 0.5 percent in physician visits at the intensive margin in the former (column 
(6)). Similar to the result from the RD model, estimates from columns (7) and (11) suggest that 
higher spending on visits to primary care physicians was mainly driven by an increase in 
expenditure per visit.   
Interpreting the results of the FE model in the case of visits to mid-level providers is more 
difficult than for physicians. This is because we cannot determine the magnitude of payment 
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changes from the fee bump for mid-level providers in some states using our data on physician 
payment rates. Although around half of state Medicaid programs pay nurse practitioners the same 
rate that they pay physicians for the same services. Other states pay them 85% or a different share 
of the physician payment rate. Further, some states differentiate payment level based on the 
particular service (Kaiser Family Foundation 2011). Therefore, by applying the physician payment 
rate to mid-level providers as we do in Panel A of Table 3-3, we effectively over-estimate the 
magnitude of the fee increase and under-estimate the impact of fee bump on utilization. In order 
to correct this problem, we collected data on the states that pay nurse practitioners at the same rate 
as physicians and then estimate our FE models on the sub-sample of these states (Table 3-3, Panel 
B).56 As expected, the magnitudes of the estimated effects for mid-level providers increase, despite 
the smaller sample size. In particular, a $10 increase in fees is associated with a 1.7 percent increase 
in visits during the year. This can be decomposed into a 1 percentage point (8.3%) increase at the 
extensive margin and a 7.3 percent increase in visits at the intensive margin, with medical 
expenditure from all sources increasing by 6.3 percent. Consistent with the RD model, we find in 
this case as well that the increase in visits to mid-level providers at the intensive margin was 
smaller in HPSAs.   
We investigated the robustness of the estimates from the FE model in several ways. First, 
we test whether the ACA Medicaid expansions had any impact on our estimates. To do this we 
estimated the FE model using the sub-samples (i.e. children only, adults only, and families with 
children). The estimated effects in the sample of children and adults with children who were less 
likely to be affected by the ACA are broadly comparable to the main results (Table 3-B-6). We 
 
 
56 Table 3-B-5 categorizes states based on whether they pay nurse practitioners the same rate as physicians and those 
that pay the former a lower rate. 
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also stratified our sample based on Medicaid expansion status as of January 2015. While some of 
our estimates lose precision when we only consider states that did not expand Medicaid, the general 
pattern of results in Table 3-B-7 is consistent with our main findings. Both of these tests suggest 
our FE estimates are not confounded by the ACA Medicaid expansion. 
Another concern about the validity of our FE model is that states may have increased 
Medicaid reimbursement rates in response to serious access problems prior to the fee bump. If so, 
the magnitude of fee bump in each state might be correlated with unobserved factors that influence 
healthcare outcomes. While the inclusion of state fixed effects can account for unobservable 
factors that are state-specific and time invariant, there is still the concern that (nonlinear) time-
varying unobserved factors could result in biased estimates. One way to test for endogeneity bias 
in the FE specification is to investigate whether the strict exogeneity assumption of the model is 
valid. To do so, we re-estimate our FE model including the first period lead of state’s Medicaid 
fees in effect in 𝑡𝑡 + 1. Finding a significant effect of future Medicaid payment rates (while 
controlling for current payment policy), could suggest we might be capturing the effects of some 
other state-level trend. Table 3-B-8 suggests that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the lead variable is zero. Importantly, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
for the contemporaneous effects are quite similar to those in Table 3-3. 
3.6 Potential Mechanisms 
3.6.1 Provider Supply 
The results in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 imply that health care providers may respond to changes in 
payment levels by making greater use of other health professionals, in this case physician assistants 
and nurse practitioners. Although we do not have practice-level data to test this mechanism 
directly, we investigate this mechanism using data on county-level per capita supply of primary 
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care physicians, physician assistants, and nurse practitioners from the Area Health Resource File. 
Although the AHRF does not distinguish between providers that participate in public versus 
private insurance programs, we expect the impact of the fee bump on total provider supply to 
mostly reflect a change in supply of providers offering services to Medicaid patients.  The results 
in Table 3-4 using the FE show that a $10 increase in Medicaid payments is associated with an 
0.064 per 10K capita increase in the supply of physician assistants and nurse practitioners. 
However, there is no significant effect of higher Medicaid payments on the per capita supply of 
primary care physicians. 
3.6.2 Place of Visit 
Our finding that enhanced payment rates increase office-based primary care physician visits could 
reflect better access to physician offices as a substitute for care received in hospital settings. In this 
section, we analyze whether higher physician payments affect the composition of ER visits, in 
particular. Any decrease in ER visits should be concentrated among those conditions that are not 
urgent and can most easily be treated by primary care providers. 
The New York University Emergency Department (Billings, Parikh and Mijanovich 2000b) 
visit severity algorithm classifies all ER visits into the following general categories based on the 
patient's diagnostic code:  
(1) Non-emergent57 
(2) Emergent/Primary Care Treatable58  
(3) Emergent/Preventable59 
 
 
57 Medical care not needed within 12 h (e.g., sore throats). 
58 Medical care needed within 12 h but safely treatable in a primary care setting (e.g., an ear infection). 
59 ER care needed but the patient could have avoided the medical issue if they had received timely and effective 
outpatient care (e.g., an asthma attack). 
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(4) Emergent/Not Preventable.60 
High levels of emergency visits in categories (1) through (3) suggest that an individual has limited 
access to other sources of regular care besides the ER (Billings, Parikh and Mijanovich 2000a). 
Because it is not possible to ascertain with certainty the degree to which an ER visit was 
emergent and/or preventable, we assign to each visit a probability of being in each of the categories 
based on the first diagnosis code. We then estimate a RD regression similar to Equation (1), but 
we replace the dependent variable with the probability the visit falls into a given category. As 
before, we examine whether the Medicaid fee bump has differential impacts on the ER use of 
individuals living in counties with an under-provision of primary care physicians. We find no 
statistically significant evidence that the Medicaid fee bump changed utilization of either type of 
ER visit (Table 3-5).  
Analogous estimates from the FE regression model are reported in Table 3-6. Our results 
suggest that higher physician reimbursement under Medicaid is associated with a 0.6 percentage 
point (7%) reduction in ER visits classified as non-urgent. However, we find no statistically 
significant evidence that increasing payments to primary care physicians changes utilization of 
either primary care treatable, preventable or non-preventable ER visits. Furthermore, increases in 
reimbursement rates in HPSAs lead to a statistically significant (0.3 percentage point, 4.3%) 
reduction in emergent, primary care treatable visits in the ER. These results suggest that the 
Medicaid fee bump resulted in a reduction in ER visits that were to some degree discretionary, but 
that no such shift occurred between hospital outpatient department care and primary care.  
 
 
60 ER care needed, not preventable (e.g., a cardiac dysrhythmia). 
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3.6.3 Prescription Drugs  
In this section, we study potential spillover effects on prescription drug use. Using the FE model, 
we find that a $10 in Medicaid fees is associated with a 2 percentage point (3.6%) increase in 
prescription drug fills (Table 3-7). In addition, there are statistically significant increases in 
utilization for certain drug classes, particularly those relevant to shorter-term acute conditions. A 
$10 increase in Medicaid payments results in a 1 percentage point (4.5%) increase in the use of 
antibiotics, while the use of CNS agents increases by 1.6 percentage points (5.9%), and the use of 
psychotherapeutic prescription drugs increases by 0.8 percentage points (9.3%). We also find a 0.6 
percentage point (3.5%) increase in the use of respiratory/allergy medications in HPSAs. The 
increase in the use of medications for mental health conditions that can be prescribed by primary 
care physicians is consistent with the finding that behavioral healthcare provider participation in 
Medicaid is particularly scarce (Buck 2011; Bishop et al. 2014). Meanwhile, there is no significant 
change in the use of cardiovascular medications (those for high blood pressure, high cholesterol, 
or heart disease) and medications used for treating diabetes. 
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the effects of the federal mandate that substantially increased Medicaid 
reimbursement for a range of common primary care services. The rate boost was significant and 
increased Medicaid rates by 73% (Zuckerman and Goin 2012). To the best of our knowledge, no 
study has investigated the effect of the ACA Medicaid fee bump on the use and composition of 
medical care services.  
Our results suggest that higher Medicaid fees increase the number of primary care visits 
among Medicaid patients without decreasing the amount of care provided to the privately insured. 
Using data on medical care utilization as well as provider supply, we find evidence that many of 
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the additional primary care visits were supplied by mid-level providers, such as nurse practitioners.  
This mechanism is consistent with the finding that dentists supply more visits by making greater 
use of dental hygienists when states expand coverage of dental services to adult Medicaid 
beneficiaries (Buchmueller, Miller and Vujicic 2016). Given established workforce shortages 
within the Medicaid healthcare delivery system, the use of mid-level providers to meet the greater 
demand for care among Medicaid enrollees is not surprising.  
The costs of the federal Medicaid fee bump were non-trivial. We find that a $10 increase in 
Medicaid reimbursement is associated with an 8.3% increase or $1.3 billion in Medicaid 
expenditure on primary care physician visits as well as a 6.3% increase or $0.3 billion increase in 
expenditure on mid-level provider visits over two years.61,62 Given that the average fee increase 
under the Medicaid fee bump was $40, this implies the fee bump led to a $6.4 billion increase in 
Medicaid expenditure. Despite its cost, we find some evidence that higher reimbursement rates 
may have resulted in a more efficient allocation of health care services. For example, our estimates 
indicate that a $10 increase in Medicaid reimbursement to primary care providers is associated 
with a 7% reduction in ER usage for non-urgent care. We also find that more generous Medicaid 
payments are associated with greater use of prescription drugs, but fewer ancillary services such 
as laboratory tests.63 The greater use of prescription drugs provides some indication that additional 
 
 
61 The change in total expenditures for physician is calculated from: (7.9 B+7.8 B*1.02)*0.083 = $1.3billion. 7.9 B 
and 7.8 B are the total expenditures for primary care physician visits for Medicaid patients in 2014 and 2013, 
respectively across states excluding Tennessee. 1.02 is the CPI index converts estimate from 2013dollars to 2014 
dollars. The change in total expenditures for mid-level providers is calculated from: (2.5 B+1.7 B*1.02)*0.063 = 
$0.3billion.2.5 B and 1.7 B are the total expenditures for mid-level primary care visits for Medicaid patients in 2014 
and 2013, respectively across states excluding Tennessee. 1.02 is the CPI index converts estimate from 2013dollars 
to 2014 dollars. 
62 We find that an increase in payments of $40, which corresponds to the average fee increase in payments under the 
Medicaid fee bump, the estimated cost of the Medicaid fee bump to the government is $6.4 B, which is consistent 
with the estimated cost of $7B to $12B by Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (Medicaid and 
CHIP Payment and Access Commission 2015). 
63 These results are available upon request. 
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primary care services led to actionable treatment plans. In addition, a reduction in lab tests could 
indicate that patients were better able to schedule appointments with the same provider or practice 
group.  
Several policies have focused on creating financial incentives to address concerns about 
physician shortage (Petterson et al. 2012; Hofer, Abraham and Moscovice 2011). By analyzing the 
impact of the Medicaid fee bump on utilization, this research contributes to the ongoing debate 
about the role of Medicaid provider payments in access to care. Our results suggest that medical 
practices can increase their capacity to treat additional Medicaid patients through greater use of 
mid-level providers Our results further suggest that individuals who live in areas that are 
underserved by primary care physicians benefit more from higher Medicaid payments. Thus, 
policymakers may wish to consider prioritizing areas with an under-provision of primary care 
physicians for payment increases to help mitigate the negative consequences of physician 
shortages. 
 
  
121 
 
References 
Alexander, D., & Schnell, M. (2017). Closing the Gap: The Impact of the Medicaid Primary 
Care Rate Increase on Access and Health. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Research 
Paper Series. Chicago, IL: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Alexander, D., & Schnell, M. (2019). Just What the Nurse Practitioner Ordered: Independent 
Prescription Authority and Population Mental Health. Journal of Health Economics, 66, 
145-162. 
Atherly, A., & Mortensen, K. (2014). Medicaid Primary Care Physician Fees and the Use of 
Preventive Services among Medicaid Enrollees. Health Services Research, 49(4), 1306-
1328. 
Baker, L. C., & Royalty, A. B. (2000). Medicaid Policy, Physician Behavior, and Health Care for 
the Low-Income Population. Journal of Human Resources, 35(3), 480-502. 
Baker, L. S., & Baker, L. C. (1994). Excess Cost of Emergency Department Visits for Nonurgent 
Care. Health Affairs, 13(5), 162–171. 
Bamezai, A., Melnick, G., & Nawathe, A. (2005). The Cost of an Emergency Department Visit 
and Its Relationship to Emergency Department Volume. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 
45(5), 483–490. 
Berman, B., Dolins, J., Tang, S.-f., & Yudkowsky, B. (2002). Factors That Influence the 
Willingness of Private Primary Care Pediatricians to Accept More Medicaid Patients. 
Pediatrics(110), 239-248. 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004). How Much Should We Trust Differences-
in-Differences Estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 249-275. 
Billings, J., Parikh, N., & Mijanovich, T. (2000). Emergency Department Use in New York City: 
A Substitute for Primary Care? Issue Brief (Commonwealth Fund). 
Billings, J., Parikh, N., & Mijanovich, T. (2000). Emergency Room Use: the New York Story. 
Issue Brief (Commonwealth Fund). 
Bishop, T. F., Press, M. J., Keyhani, S., & Pincus, H. (2014). Acceptance of Insurance by 
Psychiatrists and the Implications for Access to Mental Health Care. JAMA Psychiatry, 
71, 176-181.Buchmueller, T. C., Orzol, S., & Shore-Sheppard, L. D. (2015). The Effect 
of Medicaid Payment Rates on Access to Dental Care among Children. American Journal 
of Health Economics, 1(2), 194-223. 
Buchmueller, T., Miller, S., & Vujicic, M. (2016). How Do Providers Respond to Changes in 
Public Health Insurance Coverage? Evidence from Adult Medicaid Dental Benefits. 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 8(4), 70-102. 
Buck, J. A. (2011). The Looming Expansion and Transformation of Public Substance Abuse 
Treatment under the Affordable Care Act. Health Affairs, 30, 1402-1410. 
Callison , K., & Nguyen, B. T. (2018). The Effect of Medicaid Physician Fee Increases on 
Health Care Access, Utilization, and Expenditures. Health Services Research, 53, 690-
710. 
122 
 
Candon, M., Zuckerman, S., Wissoker, D., Saloner, B., Kenney, G. M., Rhodes, K., & Polsky, D. 
(2018). Declining Medicaid Fees and Primary Care Appointment Availability for New 
Medicaid Patients. JAMA Internal Medicine, 178(1), 145-146. 
Carr, J. B., & Packham, A. (2019). SNAP Benefits and Crime: Evidence from Changing 
Disbursement Schedules. Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(2), forthcoming. 
Chen, A. (2014). Do the Poor Benefit From More Generous Medicaid Physician Payments? 
SSRN Working Paper. 
Cohen, J. W., & Cunningham,, P. J. (1995). Medicaid Physician Fee Levels and Children’s 
Access to Care. Health Affairs, 14(1), 225–262. 
Dafny, L., & Gruber, J. (2005). Public Insurance and Child Hospitalizations: Access and 
Efficiency Effects. Journal of Public Economics, 89(1), 109-129. 
Decker, S. (2007). Medicaid Physician Fees and the Quality of Medical Care of Medicaid 
Patients in the USA. Review of Economics of the Household, 5(1), 95-112. 
Decker, S. (2009). Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees and Patterns of Ambulatory Care. 
INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organizationn, Provision, and Financing, 46, 
291-304. 
Decker, S. (2011). Medicaid Payment Levels to Dentists and Access to Dental Care Among 
Children and Adolescents. JAMA, 306(2), 187-193. 
Decker, S. (2018). No Association Found between the Medicaid Primary Care Fee Bump and 
Physician-Reported Participation in Medicaid. Health Affairs, 37, 1092-1098. 
Gray, B. (2001). Do Medicaid Physician Fees for Prenatal Services Affect Birth Outcomes? 
Journal of Health Economics, 20(4), 571-590. 
Gruber, J. (2003). Medicaid. In R. A. Moffitt (Ed.), In Means Tested Transfer Programs in the 
United States (pp. 15–77). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gruber, J., Adams, K., & Newhouse, J. P. (1997). Physician Fee Policy and Medicaid Program 
Costs. Journal of Human Resources, 32(4), 611-634. 
Health Resources and Services Administration. (2017a). Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). 
Retrieved August 2017, from https://data.hrsa.gov/topics/health-workforce/ahrf 
Health Resources and Services Administration. (2017b). Health Professional Shortage Areas 
(HPSAs). Retrieved August 2017, from http://bhpr.hrsa.gov/shortage/hpsas/ 
Hofer, A., Abraham, J. M., & Moscovice, I. (2011). Expansion of Coverage Under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act and Primary Care Utilization. The Milbank 
Quarterly, 89(1), 69-89. 
Jones, A. M. (2000). Health Economics. In Handbook of Health Economics (Vol. 1, pp. 265-
344). Elsevier. 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2011). Improving Access to Adult Primary Care in Medicaid: 
Exploring the Potential Role of Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants. Kaiser 
123 
 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. Retrieved August 2018, from 
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8167.pdf 
Kaiser Family Foundation. (2017). Community Health Center Delivery Sites and Patient Visits. 
Retrieved September 2019, from https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/community-
health-center-sites-and-
visits/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort
%22:%22asc%22%7D 
Maclean, J. C., McClellan, C., Pesko, M. F., & Polsky, D. (2018). Reimbursement Rates for 
Primary Care Services: Evidence of Spillover Effects to Behavioral Health. NBER 
Working Paper, No. w24805. 
Maclean, J. C., Pesko, M. F., & Hill, S. C. (2017). The Effect of Insurance Expansions on 
Smoking Cessation Medication Use: Evidence from Recent Medicaid Expansions. NBER 
Working Paper, No. 23450. 
Mathematica Policy Research. (2017). Medicaid Managed Care Enrollment Report. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Retrieved 
2017, from https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/managed-care/enrollment/index.html 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. (2011). Examining Access to Care in 
Medicaid and CHIP. Washington, DC: Report to the Congress on Medicaid and Chip. 
Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. (2015). Washington, DC: Report to the 
Congress on Medicaid and Chip. 
Mulcahy, A. W., Gracner, T., & Finegold, K. (2018). Associations Between the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act Medicaid Primary Care Payment Increase and 
Physician Participation in Medicaid. JAMA Internal Medicine, 178(8), 1042-1048. 
Petterson, S., Liaw, W., Phillips, R., Rabin, D., Meyers, D., & Bazemore, A. (2012). Projecting 
US Primary Care Physician Workforce Needs: 2010-2025. Annals of Family Medicine, 
10(6), 503-509. 
Polsky, D., Richards, M., Basseyn, S., Wissoker, D., Kenney, G. M., Zuckerman, S., & Rhodes, 
K. V. (2015). Appointment Availability after Increases in Medicaid Payments for 
Primary Care. The New England Journal of Medicine, 372, 537–545. 
Shen, Y. C., & Zuckerman, S. (2005). The Effect of Medicaid Payment Generosity on Access 
and Use among Beneficiaries. Health Services Research, 40(3), 723-744. 
Sloan, F., Mitchell, J., & Cromwell, J. (1978). Physician Participation in State Medicaid 
Programs. Journal of Human Resources, 13, 211-245. 
Sommers, B. D., & Grabowski, D. C. (2017). What Is Medicaid? More Than Meets the Eye. 
JAMA, 318(8), 695-696. 
Sonchak , L. (2015). Medicaid Reimbursement, Prenatal Care and Infant Health. Journal of 
Health Economics, 44, 10-24. 
124 
 
Tollen, L. (2015). Medicaid Primary Care Parity. Health Affairs Policy Brief. Washington, DC: 
Health Affairs. Retrieved June 2018 
Weinick, R. M., Burns, R. M., & Mehrotra, A. (2010). Many Emergency Department Visits 
Could Be Managed At Urgent Care Centers And Retail Clinics. Health Affairs, 29(9), 
1630–1636. 
Zuckerman, S., & Goin, D. (2012). How Much Will Medicaid Physician Fees for Primary Care 
Rise in 2013? Evidence from a 2012 Survey of Medicaid Physician Fees. Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family 
Foundation. 
Zuckerman, S., Skopec, L., & Epstain, M. (2017). Medicaid Physician Fees after the ACA 
Primary Care Fee Bump. Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
Zuckerman, S., Skopec, L., & Mccormack, K. (2014). Reversing the Medicaid Fee Bump: How 
Much Could Medicaid Physician Fees for Primary Care Fall in 2015. Health Policy 
Center Brief. 
125 
 
Figure 3-1. State-level Medicaid fees for new patient primary care services over time 
  
  
 
Notes: The above figure depicts averages of Medicaid payments with minimum and maximum for new patient 
evaluation and management services (CPT 99201-99205) across states from 2008 to 2015.  
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Figure 3-2. Effect of the Medicaid fee bump on the number of office-based visits, by provider 
type 
  
 
Notes: The monthly residualized mean (accounting for state and month fixed effects) of the log of visits to different 
providers. Primary care physician visits are visits with a physician specializing in general practice, family medicine, 
internal, or pediatrics. Physicians in other specialties are considered physician specialists. Mid-level primary care 
providers are visits with nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. All other non-physician providers are 
considered other providers. 
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Figure 3-3. Robustness check, RD estimates for different bandwidths  
 
 
Notes: Each dot represents the coefficient of interest generated by a separate regression. The various bandwidths on 
which these regressions were performed are represented on the x-axis. We also report the 95% confidence interval of 
the coefficient. Primary care visits are visits with a physician specializing in general practice, family medicine, 
internal, or pediatrics. Mid-level primary care providers are visits with nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician 
assistants.  
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Table 3-1. Descriptive statistics by insurance coverage 
  Covered by Medicaid  Covered by Private Insurance 
 All Shortage area   All Shortage area 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Medicaid fee (CPT 99203) 89.257 27.548 80.349 28.803  87.032 27.514 79.478 27.996 
Individual-level controls          
Age  17.726 15.988 18.580 16.261  34.366 18.212 34.861 18.087 
Female  0.539 0.499 0.534 0.499  0.507 0.500 0.508 0.500 
Hispanic  0.336 0.472 0.392 0.488  0.114 0.317 0.148 0.355 
Black  0.242 0.428 0.238 0.426  0.097 0.296 0.117 0.322 
Other race 0.041 0.197 0.057 0.231  0.057 0.231 0.074 0.262 
Married  0.096 0.295 0.101 0.301  0.473 0.499 0.458 0.498 
No. of children 0-5 0.692 0.876 0.643 0.843  0.299 0.620 0.297 0.622 
No. of children 6-17 1.488 1.268 1.561 1.270  0.823 1.070 0.760 1.019 
Urban  0.830 0.376 0.833 0.373  0.880 0.325 0.865 0.342 
High school/GED 0.092 0.290 0.097 0.296  0.149 0.356 0.164 0.370 
Some college 0.077 0.266 0.073 0.261  0.235 0.424 0.240 0.427 
College degree 0.021 0.144 0.023 0.151  0.310 0.462 0.298 0.458 
Missing education 0.089 0.284 0.111 0.314  0.027 0.163 0.036 0.187 
Log(income/sqrt(HH size)) 9.110 2.048 9.044 2.051  10.775 0.933 10.717 1.055 
Paid sick leave 0.027 0.163 0.028 0.165  0.448 0.497 0.457 0.498 
Good MH all rounds  0.303 0.460 0.300 0.458  0.329 0.470 0.333 0.471 
Excellent MH all rounds 0.313 0.464 0.307 0.461  0.356 0.479 0.353 0.478 
Poor/ fair MH 0.129 0.335 0.131 0.337  0.049 0.216 0.047 0.212 
Excellent MH all rounds 0.576 0.494 0.579 0.494  0.626 0.484 0.625 0.484 
Poor health all rounds 0.070 0.254 0.075 0.263  0.027 0.163 0.029 0.168 
Poor health some rounds  0.160 0.366 0.170 0.376  0.085 0.278 0.092 0.288 
Excellent health some 
rounds 0.511 0.500 0.506 0.500  0.498 0.500 0.482 0.500 
Excellent health all rounds 0.246 0.431 0.240 0.427  0.260 0.439 0.243 0.429 
Good health all rounds 0.340 0.474 0.334 0.472  0.422 0.494 0.431 0.495 
Any disability 0.057 0.232 0.058 0.233  0.011 0.106 0.011 0.105 
County and state controls          
County log(med. income) 10.822 0.248 10.768 0.192  10.912 0.247 10.820 0.169 
County unemp. rate (16+) 8.218 2.392 9.361 2.557  7.388 2.210 8.554 2.310 
State pct. BA degree 0.294 0.047 0.293 0.043  0.294 0.047 0.291 0.045 
Medicaid expansion 0.668 0.471 0.748 0.434  0.638 0.481 0.720 0.449 
Managed-care penetration 0.729 0.148 0.703 0.126  0.743 0.145 0.720 0.132 
HPSA primary care 
shortage 0.327 0.469 1.000 0.000  0.283 0.450 1.000 0.000 
County-level medical resources per 100 capita        
Nurse practitioners 0.044 0.029 0.040 0.027  0.045 0.029 0.042 0.028 
Physicians 0.073 0.027 0.069 0.023  0.078 0.030 0.070 0.024 
Hospital beds 0.300 0.189 0.295 0.174  0.295 0.187 0.299 0.168 
Pediatricians 0.018 0.012 0.017 0.010  0.019 0.012 0.017 0.011 
Observations  [24,991]  [8,641]   [48,678]  [14,697]  
Notes: Means are weighted using the sample weights provided in the MEPS to be nationally representative. 
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Table 3-4. Fixed effects estimates of a $10 Medicaid fee increase on the supply of providers 
Per capita number of primary care physicians  
   Fee 0.031 
 (0.031) 
Per capita number of nurse practitioners  
   Fee 0.064** 
 (0.027) 
Per capita number of physician assistants  
   Fee 0.039* 
 (0.022) 
  
Observations [36,598] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Sample size is reported in square brackets. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-5. RD estimates of Medicaid fee bump on emergency room and outpatient department 
usage 
 (1) (2)  
Non-urgent ER   
   Post -0.001 -0.003  
 (0.010) (0.012)  
   Post×shortage  0.003  
  (0.009)  
Observations  [6,234]  
Emergent, Primary care treatable ER   
   Post -0.009 0.005  
 (0.015) (0.017)  
   Post×shortage  -0.021  
  (0.013)  
Observations [6,234]  
Emergent, Preventable ER   
   Post 0.000 0.008  
 (0.021) (0.022)  
   Post×shortage  -0.014  
  (0.020)  
Observations [6,234]  
Emergent, Non-preventable ER   
   Post -0.018 -0.015  
 (0.012) (0.013)  
   Post×shortage  -0.005  
  (0.010)  
Observations [6,234]  
Primary care visit in office vs. outpatient  
   Post 0.003 0.003  
 (0.009) (0.011)  
   Post×shortage  0.001  
  (0.009)  
Observations [43,618]  
Notes: RD estimates specified as a linear function of time, fully interacted with a dummy for post fee bump years. All 
regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and month fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering on the distance from the cutoff. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-6. Fixed effects estimates of a $10 Medicaid fee increase on emergency room and 
outpatient department usage 
 (1)  (2) 
Non-urgent ER    
   Fee -0.006  -0.006* 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
   Fee×shortage   0.002 
   (0.002) 
Observations [6,470] 
Emergent, Primary care treatable ER    
   Fee -0.005  -0.002 
 (0.006)  (0.006) 
   Fee×shortage   -0.003* 
   (0.002) 
Observations [6,470] 
Emergent, Preventable ER    
   Fee -0.001  0.002 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
   Fee×shortage   -0.003 
   (0.004) 
Observations [6,470] 
Emergent, Non-preventable ER    
   Fee 0.005  0.005 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
   Fee×shortage   0.000 
   (0.002) 
Observations [6,470] 
Primary care visit in office vs. outpatient   
   Fee 0.003  0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.006) 
   Fee×shortage   -0.002 
   (0.002) 
Observations [45,655] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.
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Table 3-7. Fixed effects estimates of a $10 Medicaid fee increase on prescription drug access 
 (1)  (2) 
All classes    
    Fee 0.020**  0.019** 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.001 
   ((0.004) 
Cardiovascular medications    
    Fee 0.003  0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
    Fee×Shortage   -0.003 
   (0.002) 
CNS agents    
    Fee 0.016**  0.013** 
 (0.007)  (0.007) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.004 
   (0.003) 
Antibiotics    
    Fee 0.010*  0.003 
 (0.006)  (0.008) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.008** 
   (0.004) 
Mental health medications    
    Fee 0.008**  0.008** 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.001 
   (0.002) 
Diabetes medications    
    Fee 0.000  0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.003) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.000 
   (0.002) 
GI medications    
    Fee 0.001  0.001 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.000 
   (0.002) 
Respiratory medications    
    Fee 0.012  0.010 
 (0.008)  (0.008) 
    Fee×Shortage   0.006** 
   (0.003) 
Observations [24,991] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Appendix A. Model of Provider Behavior  
As illustrated in Figure 3-B-1a, providers face a downward sloping demand curve for private 
patients and a fixed unit price for treating Medicaid patients. Providers choose a quantity of output 
such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost. For a provider with a high marginal cost 
illustrated by the marginal cost curve 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶1𝑎𝑎or 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶1𝑏𝑏 , the point of intersection will be on the 
downward-sloping portion of the curve and only private patients will be seen. In contrast, a 
provider with intermediate marginal cost curves like 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶2 will participate in the private and public 
markets, with the total number of patients determined by the intersection of the marginal cost curve 
and the Medicaid price. A provider with the lowest marginal cost curves like 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶3 will also see a 
mix of public and private patients, but because there is a limit to the number of publicly insured 
patients in the market, the marginal patient will be a private patient. When Medicaid rates rise 
relative to private market fees, providers like those represented by 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶1𝑏𝑏will participate in 
Medicaid and those with a marginal cost like 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶2 that treat a mix of public and private patients 
will treat a greater number of public patients. Such changes, however, will have no effect on 
providers like those represented by 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶1𝑎𝑎. 
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Figure 3-B-1a. Provider response to Medicaid reimbursement rate increase 
 
Notes: A simple model of the supply response to the Medicaid fee bump based on Sloan, Mitchell, and Cromwell 
(1978). The effect of fee bump, illustrated by the shift of the marginal revenue curve from MR to MR′, will vary 
across providers with different marginal cost curves. 
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Appendix B. Supplementary Figures and Tables  
Figure 3-B -1. Heterogeneous effect of Medicaid fee bump across states in 2013 
 
 
Note: Tennessee has no Medicaid FFS program. 
Source: Zuckerman and Goin (2012). 
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Figure 3-B-2. Office visit utilization across types of care and insurance coverage  
 
 
 
Notes: Primary care (PC) visits are visits with a physician specializing in general practice, family medicine, internal, 
or pediatrics. Physicians in other specialty are considered physician specialists. Mid-level primary care providers are 
visits with nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants. All other non-physician providers are considered 
other providers. 
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Figure 3-B-3. Robustness of results, Estimates from the “Donut-hole” RD 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Each dot represents the donut-hole RD, by excluding a few months of observations around the threshold. We 
also report the 95% confidence interval of the coefficient. Primary care visits are visits with a physician specializing 
in general practice, family medicine, internal, or pediatrics. Mid-level primary care providers are visits with nurses, 
nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.  
  
140 
 
Figure 3-B-4. Histogram of office-based primary care visits 
Primary care physicians 
 
 
Mid-level primary care providers 
 
 
Notes: The histogram of office-based primary care visits is presented for visits from the 2011-2014 MEPS. Primary 
care visits are visits with a physician specializing in general practice, family medicine, internal, or pediatrics. Mid-
level primary care providers are visits with nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants.   
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Table 3-B-1. RD estimates of Medicaid fee bump on office-based visits among privately insured 
sample above 400% of FPL by provider type 
 (1)  (2) 
 Linear  Quadratic  
Primary care physicians    
      Extensive margin 0.004  0.004 
 (0.004)  (0.004) 
 [366,216]  [366,216] 
  Intensive margin 0.006  0.006 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
 [34,935]  [34,935] 
Mid-level primary care providers    
    
  Extensive margin 0.003  0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
 [366,216]  [366,216] 
  Intensive margin 0.031  0.022 
  (0.037)  (0.036) 
 [6,641]  [6,641] 
Notes: RD model in the first column specified as a linear function of time, fully interacted with a dummy for post fee 
bump years. The specification in the second column is quadratic in time. All regressions include time-varying 
household demographic controls, state and month fixed effects. Primary care physician visits are visits with a 
physician specializing in general practice, family medicine, internal, or pediatrics. Physicians in other specialties are 
considered specialists. Mid-level primary care providers are visits with nurses, nurse practitioners, and physician 
assistants. All other non-physician providers are considered other providers. Standard errors in parentheses are 
corrected for clustering on the distance from the cutoff. Sample size is reported in square brackets. Significance level: 
***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-B-3. Balance of covariates around the cutoff 
 Post-policy sample  Pre-policy sample p-value 
 Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  
Age 0-5 0.203 0.008  0.197 0.006 0.166 
Age 6-17 0.376 0.007  0.390 0.007 0.541 
Age 18-24 0.071 0.004  0.074 0.004 0.647 
Age 25-34 0.078 0.004  0.074 0.003 0.532 
Age 35-44 0.077 0.004  0.075 0.004 0.701 
Age 45-54 0.094 0.005  0.095 0.004 0.720 
Age 55-64 0.098 0.006  0.094 0.005 0.645 
Female 0.535 0.006  0.533 0.006 0.586 
Hispanic 0.297 0.016  0.308 0.020 0.772 
Black 0.245 0.014  0.238 0.015 0.368 
White 0.403 0.016  0.404 0.017 0.515 
Other race 0.055 0.006  0.050 0.006 0.451 
Married 0.128 0.006  0.114 0.006 0.276 
No. of children 0-5 0.630 0.024  0.608 0.022 0.752 
No. of children 6-17 1.311 0.030  1.344 0.032 0.724 
HH size 3.845 0.047  3.848 0.052 0.515 
BA degree 0.021 0.003  0.023 0.003 0.345 
log(family income) 9.181 0.039  9.013 0.045 0.054 
Midwest 0.191 0.012  0.198 0.013 0.464 
South 0.354 0.017  0.353 0.016 0.596 
West 0.246 0.019  0.251 0.019 0.729 
Disability 0.088 0.006  0.089 0.006 0.578 
Observations [14,693]   [13,542]   
Notes: Post-policy sample uses the 2013-2014 MEPS. Pre-policy uses the 2011-2012 MEPS. P-values represent a 
two-sample t-test of post-policy versus pre-policy.  
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Table 3-B-5. Categorization of state Medicaid reimbursement of nurse practitioners 
(1) (2) 
Reimbursed at the same rate as physicians Reimbursed at a rate lower than the physician rate 
California Alabama 
Colorado Alaska 
Delaware Arizona 
District of Colombia Arkansas 
Illinois Connecticut 
Iowa Florida 
Louisiana Georgia 
Maine Hawaii 
Maryland Idaho 
Massachusetts Indiana 
Michigan Kansas 
Missouri Kentucky 
Nebraska Minnesota 
New Hampshire Mississippi 
New York Montana 
North Carolina Nevada 
Ohio New Jersey 
Oregon New Mexico 
Pennsylvania North Dakota 
Utah Oklahoma 
Vermont Rhode Island 
Virginia South Carolina 
Washington South Dakota 
West Virginia Tennessee 
Wisconsin Texas 
Wyoming  
Notes: This table shows the state classification for Medicaid reimbursement rates for nurse practitioners. These are 
mutually exclusive lists of states. In column 1, state Medicaid programs reimburse nurse practitioners at the same rate 
as physicians. In column 2, Medicaid reimbursement rates vary by state and currently range from 75% to less than 
100%of the physician rate. 
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Table 3-B-6. Fixed effects estimates of a $10 Medicaid fee increase on office-based primary care 
visits, subgroup analysis 
 Overall Extensive Intensive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Children       
Primary care physicians       
   Fee 0.022* 0.018 0.016*** 0.014 0.011 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Fee×shortage  0.006  0.002  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Observations [17,391] [17,391] [10,478] 
Mid-level primary care providers       
   Fee 0.018** 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.031 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.032) (0.030) 
Fee×shortage  0.000  0.003  -0.020 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.016) 
Observations [17,391] [17,391] [1,147] 
Panel B. HHs with children        
Primary care physicians       
   Fee 0.019* 0.016 0.016** 0.016 0.002 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Fee×shortage  0.004  0.001  0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Observations [22,795] [22,795] [13,385] 
Mid-level primary care providers       
   Fee 0.002 0.000 0.010* 0.003 0.029 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.034) (0.041) 
Fee×shortage  0.003  0.005  -0.010 
  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.018) 
Observations [22,795] [22,795] [1,644] 
Panel C. Adults        
Primary care physicians       
   Fee 0.043* 0.048* 0.029** 0.031 0.008 0.013 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) 
Fee×shortage  -0.007  -0.004  -0.007 
  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Observations [7,600] [7,600] [4,342] 
Mid-level primary care providers       
   Fee 0.017 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.055 0.098 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.009) (0.059) (0.066) 
Fee×shortage  0.008  0.009  -0.029 
  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.024) 
Observations [7,600] [7,600] [776] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Sample size is reported in square brackets. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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Table 3-B-7. Fixed effects estimates of a $10 Medicaid fee increase on office-based primary care 
visits by ACA Medicaid expansion status 
 Overall Extensive Intensive 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A. Expansion states       
Primary care physicians       
   Fee 0.022* 0.018 0.016* 0.016 0.011 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) 
Fee×shortage  0.006  0.002  0.004 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Observations [16,993] [16,993] [8,892] 
Mid-level primary care providers       
   Fee 0.018* 0.010 0.003 0.005 0.015 0.031 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.032) (0.030) 
Fee×shortage  0.000  0.003  -0.020 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.016) 
Observations [16,993] [16,993] [1,153] 
Panel B. Non-Expansion states        
Primary care physicians       
   Fee 0.019* 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.002 0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Fee×shortage  0.004  0.001  0.002 
  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Observations [7,988] [7,988] [5,928] 
Mid-level primary care providers       
   Fee 0.002 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.029 0.037 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.034) (0.041) 
Fee×shortage  0.004  0.005  -0.010 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.018) 
Observations [7,988] [7,988] [770] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Sample size is reported in square brackets. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1.  
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Table 3-B-8. Test for strict exogeneity in the fixed-effects model  
Panel A. Full-sample 
 Any visit 
 
Log(#Visits) 
Primary care physicians   
  Feet 0.009 0.013* 
 (0.008) (0.007) 
  Feet+1 
 -0.004 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations [40,119] [24,275] 
 
Panel B. States with nurse practitioner reimbursement rates at the 100% of the physician rates 
 Any visit 
 
Log(#Visits) 
Mid-level primary care providers   
  Feet 0.004 0.024 
 (0.005) (0.017) 
  Feet+1 
 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.016) 
Observations [24,908] [1,988] 
Notes: All regressions include time-varying household demographic controls, state and county characteristics, state 
and year fixed effects, and state specific linear time trend. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at the state-level. Sample size is reported in square brackets. Significance level: ***p < 0.01. **p < 0.05. *p < 0.1. 
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